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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Goal and Organization of the Paper 
This paper addresses the development of Dutch government policies on the agro sector1 in a 
long-term historical perspective. Agro policies touch upon a wide range of matters, from 
export, competitiveness and employment to sustainability, animal welfare and food security, 
Unsurprisingly, they are a topic of heated debate. Aspects of Dutch agro policies have 
received both praise and condemnation. A long-term assessment of agro policies shows that 
policy priorities have shifted quite radically over time. States’ concerns about food supply and 
food security have existed for as long as states themselves, and remain of key relevance to this 
day. In addition, the agro sector has always employed a large section of the working 
population and played an important role in economic life. Even today, the agro sector 
accounts for a considerable share of GDP (1o%) and an even larger share of exports. To ensure 
an economically healthy and competitive agro sector, policies specifically designed to 
improve productivity and competitiveness have been developed over the past two centuries.  
 
Additionally, since the 1970s the sector’s sustainability has increasingly become a key policy 
concern, as the negative aspects of agricultural production for people, landscape and 
environment became clear. This paper attempts to fully acknowledge the fact that both the 
historical context in which the agro sector operates and the state’s policy priorities towards 
the sector have changed radically over time. The key question driving the analysis is as 
follows:  
 
To what extent have Dutch state policies (1795-present) been successful in 
enabling the agro sector to cope with emerging challenges? 
 
Clearly, this paper can only touch broadly on the many historical and contemporary 
complexities involved in agro policy. Rather than attempting a full account, the paper aims at 
providing the reader with a comprehensive literature overview and proposes an overarching 
narrative that places agro policy in a long-term historical perspective, with a focus on 
agricultural policy. The paper has been written as a background document for a research 
project about economic policy, conducted by the Netherlands Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (WRR).2 The paper also addresses the question of the extent to which we 
can learn from historical policies to inform today’s policymaking. 
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The paper is divided into an Introduction that summarizes the key arguments, two ‘core’ 
chapters that give a historical overview of Dutch agro policies, and a conclusion which 
synthesizes the arguments. The chapters are organized chronologically: the first chapter deals 
with the period from 1795 to 1930, the second the period from the 1930s to the present. Both 
chapters include a first section focusing on the most important challenges for the agro 
sector.3 It also discusses the way in which the agro sector has responded institutionally to 
emerging challenges in terms of collective organization. The chapters then move on to a 
second section describing the actions of the state in relation to the agro sector. Each chapter 
concludes with a third section reflecting on the causes and effects of state policies.  
 
Throughout the chapters, international comparisons are made in order to place the Dutch 
situation in a wider context. The final chapter synthesizes some of the key conclusions 
resulting from these two chapters. In terms of periodization, other choices could have been 
made. Some would point out that a cut-off point in the late 19th century would be appropriate, 
as the Netherlands quickly industrialized and state policies changed rapidly. Others might 
argue that the 1980s or the 2000s are crucial cut-off points, the first as sustainability became 
a key concern in this period, the second because food prices seem to be rising and concerns 
about food scarcity on a worldwide scale have returned. However, the chosen periodization is 
justified, since in a long-term historical perspective the 1930s can be considered to be the key 
turning point for both agriculture and agricultural policy, as will become clear. 
 
In order to analyze the spectrum of policy instruments that has historically been applied to 
the agro sector, a policy typology constructed by H.-J. Chang (2009) is used.4 Chang 
introduces this typology in a paper discussing possible lessons from historical agricultural 
policies for current developing countries. Chang draws a basic distinction between input 
policies and output policies. Input policies include land policies, knowledge policies, credit 
policies and the delivery of physical inputs such as irrigation and electricity facilities, but also 
fertilizers, seeds and machines. As such, input policies directly affect the factors of 
production (land, labour, capital).5 Among output policies, Chang includes measures that 
affect markets and prices, such as price guarantees and trade protectionism, as well as 
policies on marketing (propaganda) and enhancement of product quality. Output policies 
thus affect what happens to products when they go from producer to the market.6 In practice, 
the distinction between different policy instruments is often hard to make very sharply, and 
works better in some contexts than in others.7 The p0licy typology should therefore not be 
interpreted in a fully comprehensive approach, but is used rather to structure the argument.8  
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Policy instruments cannot be isolated and abstracted from those who formulate and execute 
policy and those who are on the receiving end of the policy. Therefore, it is important to 
acknowledge that neither ‘the state’ nor ‘the agro sector’ are stable and well-defined entities.  
 
The state obviously consists of multiple ‘actors’9 itself, and what makes up the state also 
changes quite radically over time. Equally, the agro sector consists of different actors10 and 
develops over time. It should be acknowledged that actors within the state as well as the agro 
sector can have, and often have had, conflicting interests.11 This paper tries to take into 
consideration the diversity within the agro sector whenever this is necessary for the 
argument, and further problematizes this issue in the concluding chapter. As regards the 
state, the paper focuses on the role of the Ministry of Agriculture and a range of organizations 
that are closely related to it. To reduce complexity, the paper pays less attention to other 
ministries. Nevertheless, the fact that the state has been a champion of – often conflicting – 
specific interests is acknowledged,12 even though the state, in its most abstract 
conceptualization, is supposed to embody a collective interest, or at least execute policies on 
the basis of broadly and publicly defensible grounds. Conflicts, ambiguity and dilemmas 
arising from this dual role of the state are discussed whenever necessary for the argument. 
Where necessary, the paper also attempts to take into consideration the broader institutional 
context affecting the agricultural sector.  
 
1.2 Brief outline of the arguments 
At the time when the first significant state agro policies were enacted around 1800, Dutch 
farmers (especially in the coastal provinces) were already highly specialized, export-oriented 
and competitive. The state recognized the importance of the agro sector (at that point more 
or less synonymous with agriculture) for the national economy and enacted new policies with 
revolutionary fervour, making up for a ‘policy lag’ that had developed in the latter years of the 
Dutch Republic. However, state capacity was still limited and agriculture was not yet 
sufficiently organized (certainly not on a national level) to cooperate effectively with the state.  
 
Moreover, laissez-faire ideology diminished the enthusiasm for agro policies, especially as 
the sector was flourishing and seemed in little need for help. Only at the end of the 19th 
century did the state begin to focus its attention on the agricultural sector again. Although the 
belief in a laissez-faire approach was still strong, state capacity had significantly increased (a 
more robust legal framework, larger state budget and more manpower), and the agro sector 
was better organized (through societies, unions, cooperatives and a national organization). 
Most importantly, the agro sector was confronted with serious competitive challenges, which 
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not only endangered the future of a key export sector and the profitability of a large number 
of individual farmers, but which also threatened to lead to large-scale rural poverty.  
 
The state reacted to these challenges by initiating a range of input policies (building a 
knowledge infrastructure, stimulating availability of credit and fertilizers) as well as quality 
control measures to stimulate productivity and exports. Many of these policies already 
existed abroad, but were now rolled out proactively by the Dutch state. At the same time, the 
state refrained from introducing market and pricing policies, recognizing the importance of 
exports and holding on to its laissez-faire ideals. The outcome of these early policy 
interventions, which remained in place up until the 1920s, can be (and often is) assessed as 
generally positive. The sector flourished and agricultural employment remained high. State 
policies were conducive to a shift to high-value added products in horticulture and livestock 
farming, and productivity levels increased considerably. This success can be explained by the 
fact that the state was well equipped to deal with the imperatives of the day, such as 
emancipation of small farmers, access to credit, large-scale implementation of modern 
fertilization methods and the establishment of reliable quality standards. The close 
relationship with the sector contributed to the effectiveness of policies. It also increased the 
general commitment of the state to the sector.  
 
The 1930s signify a break in terms of both agricultural development and state policies 
towards the sector. In the early 1930s, saturating markets and decreasing export 
opportunities squeezed margins in the agro sector, and a total collapse of the sector loomed. 
Convinced of the exceptional nature of – and anticipating improvement in – the situation 
and pushed by a proactive agricultural lobby, the state abandoned its laissez-faire principles 
and intervened in agro markets and prices. It also stepped up its input policy efforts to 
support the large number of small farmers who owed their existence to the conditions that 
prevailed in the preceding period, in which smallholdings had thrived. The imperatives of the 
Second World War reinforced the state’s directive role.  
 
However, when the situation returned to normal, the state did not withdraw from agriculture, 
but instead stepped up its efforts on both the input and output side. As agro prices did not 
keep up with general price levels and the role of non-agricultural players in agro chains 
increased, the agricultural sector came under considerable pressure to increase productivity. 
Committed to post-war reconstruction and growth and the maintenance of a productive and 
competitive agricultural sector, the state stepped up its efforts. The state ‘managed’ a rapid 
restructuring of agriculture, involving a process of scaling up, land consolidation and outflow 
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of labour. It did this in close cooperation with the sector. Again, the state was well equipped 
to take up this role as the challenges facing the sector required coordinated, top-down efforts.  
 
From the 1970s onwards, the situation began to change. Although competitive pressures 
continued to challenge the sector to produce more efficiently, ecological challenges, more 
vocal consumers and pressure on government expenditures began to challenge the existing 
pattern of agricultural development and the role of the state therein. Moreover, the 
‘traditional’ agricultural sector in which the existing policy regime had been conceived in 
earlier decades no longer existed. The number of farmers had decreased drastically, and 
those remaining had become skilled agro-entrepreneurs with more diverse interests than 
before, while the power of large corporate players in the agro sector had increased. Moreover, 
the market demanded diverse products rather than bulk, and product diversification and 
innovation had become more important. This new set of societal and competitive challenges 
undermined the logic of the existing, ‘top-down’ policy regime.  
 
However, the close relationship between state and sector and the strong focus on productivity 
were deeply engrained. A difficult period of crisis and transition ensued. In recent decades, a 
new relationship between state and agro sector has been developing, in which the state takes 
a different role. No longer is the state primarily committed to the development of the 
economic potential of the sector; instead it focuses on the one hand on implementing policies 
to reduce negative externalities produced by the sector, and on the other on stimulating 
innovation and cooperation between private parties.  
 
It should be noted that despite the policy regime shift since the 1970s, there has always been 
a constant underlying policy goal of maintaining a competitive and export-oriented agro 
sector. Considering the current competitiveness of the agro sector, operating with little in the 
way of market interventions in competitive international markets, this underlying policy goal 
seems to have been pursued successfully, though it has to be acknowledged that the agro 
sector is under continuous pressure to continue innovating. When measured in terms of 
environmental impact or other criteria, the success of agro policies is more contested. 
 
1.3 Scholarly contextualization 
Secondary literature forms the backbone of this paper.13 Hundreds of relevant books and 
numerous articles and book chapters have been written on various aspects of the history of 
the Dutch agro sector and state policies towards it. While the historiography is voluminous 
and varied, it is unfortunate that most of the literature has been written only in Dutch,14 thus 
limiting the pool of potential readers and inhibiting the international dissemination of 
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knowledge about the ‘Dutch case’ that is necessary for comparative investigations. The 
literature also shows a clear preference for specific sub-topics, while neglecting others. 
Besides a well-developed literature on Dutch agricultural history in general,15 well-studied 
policy-related topics include biographical sketches of key figures in Dutch agricultural 
history,16 the history of regional and national agricultural organizations and political 
representation,17 the history of farmer cooperatives,18 the history of agricultural research, 
education and extension policy,19 the post-World War II structural policy,20 the role of the 
Netherlands in the formation of European agricultural policy21 and the recent history of the 
Dutch Ministry of Agriculture22. Still lacking are long-term, comprehensive and critical 
reviews of agricultural policies embedded in the wider historical – political, institutional and 
economic – context.23 Such reviews could be of great value to a growing comparative 
literature on agriculture and agricultural policy,24 or in informing wider debates about the 
relationship between states and markets. Moreover, as different authors have argued, a better 
understanding of historical policies not only leads to a better comprehension of the past, but 
can also contribute to our knowledge of economic development processes more broadly and 
yield relevant information for current policymakers.25  
 
Remarkably scarce are investigations into the historical development of the agro-food chain 
in its totality, and especially the relationship between agriculture and the agro-food industry, 
which includes producers of feeds, seeds, fertilizers, machines and technologies, as well as 
the processing industry, wholesalers and retailers. 26 The historical development of the 
interaction between the food chain and consumers also seems to be a relatively unexplored 
field.27 Nor has much been published about government policies towards the agro sector as a 
whole, as opposed to policies focusing on agriculture specifically.  
 
This hiatus in the literature is remarkable, given that the relationship between the state, 
agriculture and the agro-food industry has changed immensely over time under the influence 
of factors such as the marked internationalization and industrialization of the food chain, and 
warrants more research. The hiatus is also remarkable from a contemporary Dutch 
perspective, since the agro sector is considered to be one of the crown jewels of the Dutch 
economy, accounting for more than 10 percent of gross national product and an even more 
impressive share in export statistics.28 As no primary sources were consulted for this paper, 
the degree to which it can adequately tackle the issue of ‘agro policy’ rather than the more 
specific ‘agricultural policy’ is necessarily constrained, although attempts are made to achieve 
as broad a perspective as possible.  
 
2 THE STATE GETS INVOLVED (1795-1930) 
 
2.1 The agro sector: challenges and responses  
2.1.1 Historical context and key trends 
State agro policies in the Dutch Republic were chiefly focused on taxing production and 
exports. Other issues were left to the provincial or local levels of government, or to the private 
sector. The Dutch state began to get actively involved in agriculture for the first time around 
the turn of the 19th century. It encountered a large number of well-established, competitive 
and resilient farmers, especially in the coastal provinces.29 Dutch agriculture, along with 
British and Flemish agriculture, was the most productive in north-western Europe, both in 
terms of labour and land productivity (Van Zanden 1997: 364-5; Allen 2000: 20). This 
observation should be understood in the broader context of well-developed markets and a 
good institutional climate for growth that had existed in the Low Countries since the 16th 
century. Also important was the fact that agriculture had been able to adapt in the face of 
economic stagnation in the late 17th and 18th centuries, thanks in part to labour-saving 
innovations, scaling up and new export opportunities to the growing British market.  
 
In the complex and all-encompassing process of economic change that characterizes the 19th 
and early 20th century, two developments stand out as having the biggest impact on 
agriculture: the industrialization of the economy and the integration of markets.30 The 
process of sustained economic growth that began in Britain in the second half of the 18th 
century and subsequently took hold in Germany, Belgium and the United States, had a 
marked effect on agriculture. In an industrializing economy, agriculture played a lesser role 
in terms of added value or share of employment. At the same time it also became more 
specialized and productive, delivering essential foods and raw materials to a broad range of 
highly productive industries.31 Domestic products were increasingly supplemented by 
imports from (former) colonies, such as wood, tropical oils and foods (Federico 2005). As a 
result, food prices remained low, while overall consumption levels rose. No longer was food 
the most important expenditure for the majority of people.32  
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Figure 2.1 Development of total exports of agricultural products in the 
Netherlands, showing the increasing importance of unprocessed 
livestock products in the second half of the 19th century and 
processed livestock products in the late 19th and early 20th century 
 
Source: Pilat (1988) 
 
2.1.2 Reacting to market integration 
The Dutch agro sector became more export-oriented in the period 1800-1930.33 The 
percentage of total agricultural output produced for export rose from 9 percent in 1810 to 
between 25 and 30 percent in 1910 (Van Zanden 1986: 88). When seen in the context of the 
broader Dutch economy, too, the export of agricultural products was important. In 1920 half 
of total Dutch exports consisted of agricultural products, compared to a quarter of imports, of 
which a considerable proportion was imported for further processing in the agro-industrial 
sector.34 The fact that the Netherlands became and remained an important agro exporter 
must be seen in the context of its late industrialization in the 19th century (see next section).  
 
In the 19th century, the British market was the most important outlet for cheese, butter, 
margarine and meat. Around the turn of the century, France, Belgium and, most notably, 
Germany became more important.35 As transportation possibilities over land and sea 
expanded with the introduction of steam trains and ships, the Netherlands gained the status 
of exporter of processed and unprocessed food and raw materials to surrounding industrial 
centres. This role persisted even after the Netherlands itself began to industrialize rapidly.  
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The integration of markets in the 19th century not only expanded export opportunities, but 
also increased the competitive pressure on the Dutch agro sector, as international 
competitors profited from the same development towards increased market integration. After 
the Napoleonic wars (1803-15), arable farmers, who at that time accounted for approximately 
half of all agricultural output, were confronted with falling prices due to a large influx of grain 
from the fertile ‘black soil’ of Ukraine and Russia. However, profits returned as periods of 
war made the ‘black soil’ supply irregular, and because demand grew due to rapid population 
growth and failed potato harvests in north-western Europe. Moreover, arable farmers 
profited from low wage costs and managed to increase yields through a series of innovations. 
36 Agricultural export opportunities rapidly increased after Britain’s protective Corn Laws 
were abolished in the 1840s and the British market demanded increasing amounts of raw 
materials and foods from abroad.37 For arable farmers in the Netherlands, especially those in 
Groningen, the years between 1840 and 1870 were so successful that they were later referred 
to as the ‘champagne years’.  
 
However, when a second wave of cheap grain flooded the north-western European market in 
the 1870s – this time from the United States, which was able to ship bulk products profitably 
due to significant improvements in steam ship technology – prices plummeted and the 
profitability of arable farming was again put under serious pressure, leading to what is 
generally referred to as the ‘Great Agricultural Crisis’ (1876-1895).38 Although land 
productivity in north-western Europe was very high, farmers were confronted with the 
problem that it was almost impossible to achieve similar levels of labour productivity as their 
American colleagues as land was scarcer, agricultural holdings smaller and opportunities for 
labour-saving mechanization more limited. This time, therefore, the fall in prices was not just 
incidental or temporary but structural, as European arable farmers were now confronted with 
a completely different overseas agricultural system which could produce at lower cost.39 
 
When cheap cereals hit the European market in the 1870s, some arable farmers managed to 
sustain their profitability by cutting costs, scaling up or switching to the production of raw 
materials for new industries.40 They also benefited from new imports, such as saltpetre 
fertilizers from Chilean mines.41 More spectacular, however, was the rise of livestock 
production that had begun earlier in the 19th century.42 Livestock farmers profited from 
increasing demand, while not suffering from harsh competition from Eastern European or 
overseas competitors. Most notably, a very large number of small farmers and farm labourers 
in the sandy inland regions found new opportunities in the export market for butter, cheese, 
pig meat and eggs.43  
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Just as remarkable as the rise in exports of livestock products was the rapidly increasing 
significance of horticultural exports – flowers, fruit and vegetables – produced in a number 
of specialized horticultural regions throughout the country. Despite these beneficial 
circumstances, Dutch livestock and horticultural farmers faced a competitive challenge, 
coming mostly from other agricultural export countries such as Denmark, competing to 
supply the biggest import markets, most notably Britain.44 In the late 19th century, for 
example, Dutch butter was pushed out of the British market by Danish butter which was 
considered to be of better quality, as Dutch butter suffered from a bad reputation as a 
consequence of large-scale adulteration (tellingly referred to as ‘Dutching’). As a result, 
Dutch butter producers had to find markets elsewhere (Germany) or switch to other 
products, such as pig meat, a market in which they again had to compete with the Danish.  
 
Figure 2.2 Dutch agricultural output 1807-2010. A clear shift from arable to 
horticulture and livestock production can be discerned 
 
Sou
rce: Knibbe (1993); Smits et al. (2000); CBS/LEI Land- en Tuinbouwcijfers (1951-2010)45 
 
2.1.3 Reacting to industrialization  
The industrialization of Europe, in full swing in the second half of the 19th century, greatly 
affected the agro sector. Characteristic of the process of industrialization is a decline in the 
percentage of the workforce employed in agriculture. Approximately 40 percent of the Dutch 
workforce was still employed in agriculture in 1850. In the middle of the 19th century, the 
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Netherlands itself was confronted with a stagnant economy and impoverization, though was 
also endowed with a high initial wealth level. The Dutch ‘take-off’ towards industrialization 
and sustained per capita growth took place only from the 1860s onwards, and took a different 
form from that in most surrounding countries.46 This is illustrated by the fact that by the eve 
of the First World War, a substantial 30 percent of the Dutch workforce was still employed in 
agriculture. The percentages in Denmark were even higher, and France and Germany were 
also still largely rural economies.47 Nonetheless, these figures are more remarkable in the 
case of the Netherlands as it had long been the most urbanized country in Europe and thus 
started from a relatively low rural share in the economy.  
 
The Dutch figures are also telling when compared to those for Britain. Just under half the 
British working population were employed in agriculture in 1750, a higher percentage than in 
the Netherlands at that time. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the British percentage declined 
rapidly, to 22 percent in 1850 and just 9 percent in 1900 (less than a third of the Dutch 
figure). Even more informative in understanding the continuing importance of agriculture in 
the Netherlands is the fact that the absolute number of people engaged in agriculture 
continued rising until the 1910s and remained at a very high level until 1950, when a rapid 
decline set in.48 The fact that agricultural employment in the Netherlands grew and settled at 
a high level until after the Second World War is an anomaly in the north-western European 
context.  
 
As long as Dutch agriculture retained its small-scale, labour-intensive structure, farmers had 
no choice but to adopt new methods, in order to keep up with their competitors. Agriculture 
became more capital-intensive, and as a result farmers became more integrated in (and 
dependent on) new markets for credit, inputs and outputs. An important change was the 
mechanization of the processing of agricultural products. For example, a large number of 
potato starch, sugar beet, strawboard, dairy and meat processing factories were established.  
 
The industrial processing of dairy products (thanks largely to the invention of the centrifugal 
separator) was especially spectacular as it shifted the production of cheese and butter from 
farm to factory. On the farm itself, a range of new technologies, techniques and inputs 
unlocked enormous potential for labour- and land-productivity growth in the half-century 
leading up to World War I.  
 
The ‘industrialization of agriculture’ took hold in the second half of the 19th century, in the 
context of an emerging Dutch chemical and food industry. The Great Agricultural Crisis (see 
above) temporarily slowed the process of adoption of innovations in agriculture, but when 
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prices increased again around 1895, a period of considerable productivity growth ensued. A 
key change was the increasing use of fertilizers49 and fodder,50 often bought off the farm from 
the newly established chemical industry, which was in turn able to profit from (and therefore 
encouraged) fertilizer use in Dutch agriculture. Compared to their colleagues in the 
surrounding countries, Dutch farmers adopted artificial fertilization and fodder rapidly and 
on a large scale after 1895.51 They also began to cooperate to create superior breeds of cereals 
and cattle.  
 
Figure 2.3 Labour in agriculture, 1800-2000, in absolute numbers and as a 
share of the working population. The importance of agriculture in 
the 19th century can be seen clearly from the rising absolute 
number of people employed in the sector 
 
Source: CBS 
 
Like the integration of markets, technological innovations and industrialization also had a 
dark side for Dutch farmers, and in some cases for the agro sector as a whole. Dairy farmers 
now had to compete with margarine entrepreneurs, who largely took over the British export 
market and laid the foundation for the later Anglo-Dutch multinational Unilever. The 
centuries-old madder (red colorant) business completely collapsed when German chemists 
found a chemical substitute, alizarin. Chains of production grew longer and farmers often 
had to engage in hostile price negotiations with suppliers and buyers in the agro chain on 
whom they had become highly dependent. Although different links in the chain shared in the 
success of the agro sector, their interests were far from uniform and harmonized. Most 
importantly, farmers had no choice but to adopt the most important innovations, because 
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otherwise their competitive position would be seriously endangered. In other words, in the 
late 19th century farmers were already having to adapt to industrial society or perish. 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that industrialization offered new opportunities to farmers, but 
also intensified the competitive challenge: it was only by adopting new inputs, techniques 
and technologies (mostly land-saving innovations (Van Zanden 1991)) that the large number 
of small farmers were able to stay competitive and maintain their level of earnings. In 
practice, this did not always work out. Agricultural work was very time-consuming, leaving 
little time for leisure, and was also increasingly less rewarding in purely financial terms than 
work in industry. This has led economic historians to use the term ‘self-exploitation’ 
(willingness ‘to work on the land for incomes below the going wage rate’) to describe the work 
attitude of farmers (Van Zanden 1991: 236) The fact that no large-scale agricultural firms 
developed in this period (although such firms did develop in the inputs and processing 
industry) also testifies to the limited possibilities to make a profit in the primary sector.52 
During the Great Agricultural Crisis of the late 19th century, in particular, conditions for 
farmers were dire, as the need for development increased while the means to achieve it 
(capital, time for training, etc.) were squeezed.  
 
2.1.4 Institutional changes in the sector 
The competitive challenges described above induced the development of new institutions. 
Most notably, from the 1870s onwards farmers and the rural communities surrounding them 
initiated a whole range of cooperative initiatives, including cooperative purchasing 
associations, cooperative processing factories, rural credit cooperatives and auctions. These 
initiatives helped to solve problems of collective action, improved the reputation of products, 
increased the confidence, interest representation and market power of small farmers and 
opened up new possibilities for pooled investment.53 The period between 1880 and 1920 was 
especially fertile in terms of the number of agricultural cooperatives conceived. Sometimes 
cooperatives managed to become powerful players in the market and compete with or even 
push aside private firms, as happened in the dairy and potato starch processing industries. 
 
Besides cooperatives, a range of other organizations contributed to a more collective, well-
represented and self-conscious farming population in the Netherlands. As mentioned before, 
the first agricultural organizations had been established in the late 18th century, but they were 
usually populated by members of the (urban) elites and perhaps some of the largest and 
wealthiest farmers. From the 1830s onwards, new agricultural societies were founded on a 
regional level.54 These agricultural societies established a solid position over time and, 
especially after they began to cooperate on a national level in the ‘Dutch Agricultural 
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Committee’ (Nederlandsch Landbouw Comité- NLC) in the 1880s, strengthened their voice in 
national politics.55 Cornelis Jacob Sickesz, founder of the NLC, used the argument that 
‘collective, concerted and powerful action’ would show ‘people and government’ that 
agriculture was ‘an important source of wealth for the Netherlands and that agricultural 
interests were the interests of the nation’ (Vermeulen 1966: 47-48).  
 
In the half century leading up to World War II, the organizational density in agriculture 
increased, while, in line with other social and economic spheres in the Netherlands, a process 
of pillarization took place, with liberal, Catholic and Protestant farmers,56 as well as Catholic, 
Protestant and socialist farm labourers, represented in different organizations.57  
 
By 1920, the framework of three overarching agricultural associations, Collectieve Landbouw 
Organisaties (CLOs) and a number of labour unions was established. This organizational 
framework remained intact until the late 20th century. The agricultural societies greatly 
contributed to the diffusion of knowledge through competitions, courses, exhibitions and 
publications. In addition, agricultural education became more institutionalized and 
knowledge institutions were established in various locations.58  
 
2.2 The state: policy regimes and instruments 
The involvement of the Dutch state in agriculture increased to unprecedented levels after 
1795.59 The Batavian/French reforms in the first decade of the 19th century imposed a new set 
of institutions on the Netherlands to regulate the economy, including a more powerful and 
proactive central government and a clearer legal (property rights) regime. The reforms also 
included an initial period of proactive agricultural policy initiatives. However, state 
involvement with agriculture was not sustained and strongly diminished in the second and 
third quarter of the 19th century. Important general policies on infrastructure, regulation and 
education that also benefited agriculture were however enacted and even expanded further.  
 
From the 1880s onwards, the state again became increasingly active in supporting 
agricultural development. It funded a growing range of activities in education, extension and 
research, set up a system of quality control and facilitated the development of agricultural 
societies and cooperatives. This time, the efforts were sustained, and the first foundations 
were laid for later agricultural policy. Throughout the period 1795-1930, very little market 
intervention took place to support agriculture, which sets the Netherlands apart from most 
other countries in north-western Europe.  
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The state policies in relation to agriculture should be seen in the context of the increasingly 
urgent competitive challenge faced by this important sector. The actions of the Dutch 
government should also be seen in an international context, as the governments in 
surrounding countries were also stepping up their efforts to support their domestic 
agricultural sectors, in a variety of ways. This section discusses the development of state 
activities with regard to agriculture,60 highlights the most important activities and policies, 
places Dutch agro policies in an international context and assesses the effects of Dutch 
agricultural policies.  
 
2.2.1 Reformist policy: the first state initiatives (1795-1815) 
Policies in the Dutch Republic had been conducive to the development of a specialized, 
productive and competitive agro sector. The trade-minded policies of the Republic facilitated 
the import of low value-added agricultural products such as lean cattle and grain, so that 
farmers in the coastal Dutch provinces were able to specialize in high value-added products 
at an early stage. At the same time, the state did not actively support agriculture (rather the 
opposite, through high taxation and export levies). By the second half of the 18th century, the 
idea that agriculture was an important source of wealth began to take root in intellectual 
circles,61 thanks both to progressive thinkers who were inspired by the Enlightenment, 
especially the Physiocrats, and aristocratic Dutch landowners who, in the context of 
increasing importance of agriculture in an economy that was otherwise not very dynamic, 
saw their public power increase.62 Until 1795, however, few policies were enacted for the 
benefit of agriculture.  
 
The rise of a more powerful, centralized state during the Batavian/French period (1795-1815) 
led to the emergence of agricultural policy on a national scale. A range of regulations was 
enacted affecting aspects of the input side of agriculture, including breeding practices, cattle 
disease prevention,63 crop protection, reclamation, the use of manure and quality protection 
of important export products. Centralized policy was also stimulated by the Napoleonic 
continental system, which temporarily limited imports and exports, creating a need for a 
policy to stimulate reclamation and the production of cereals and sugar beet. Policy efforts 
were also aimed at reforming land ownership, to make it easier to raise taxes, and to improve 
the efficiency of land use.64 In 1832, the process of land registration was completed, although 
elements of common land use remained in some places into the 20th century. 
 
As there was hardly any experience with agricultural policy, the necessary administrative 
apparatus had to be built from scratch, a task that was taken up with fervour by Jan Kops 
who, from 1800 to 1815, became the first state agricultural civil servant.65 Kops argued that 
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‘agriculture is one of the most important sources of domestic wealth and must therefore be 
well cared for by the state.’66 He saw it as one of his most important tasks to eliminate the 
knowledge gap in the civil service that hindered an effective policy on agriculture. He 
acknowledged that many efforts were needed to achieve this.  
 
Not only was an extensive survey sent to all regional agricultural societies and key 
individuals, but Kops also joined Johannes Goldberg, who fulfilled the position of ‘agent of 
the national economy’ (Minister of Economic Affairs), on a five-month tour around the 
country to gain a good overview of the state of Dutch agriculture. To improve the 
organization of agriculture, Kops founded ‘provincial agriculture committees’ (Provinciale 
Commissiën van de Landbouw), which met a few times between 1806 and 1823 to discuss 
agricultural matters, founded an agricultural magazine (Magazijn der Vaderlandsche 
landbouw 1805), established a yearly report on the state of agriculture in the Netherlands 
(1806) and organized a permanent exhibition of agricultural machines and tools for farmers 
(Kabinet van landbouw 1810) (Vermeulen 1966: 3-5). 
 
2.2.2 Laissez-faire policy: the primacy of private initiative (1815-1886) 
After 1815, in the early years of the Dutch monarchy, the government took a more distanced 
stance on economic affairs and the efforts in relation to agriculture also subsided. Many of 
the measures taken before 1815 petered out, others continued at a low ebb. The provincial 
state committees, for example, were not very active, unlike the privately organized regional 
agricultural societies, and were finally abolished in 1851, as Parliament was no longer willing 
to fund them. In the early years of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, under the reign of 
William I (1815-1840), there were differing views on the economic policy to be followed.  
 
Some – among them Thorbecke, who was then a Member of Parliament – preferred a liberal 
course of free trade, while others – among them King William I – preferred a more 
mercantilist approach in which the development of a domestic industry and agriculture 
would be the central aim. In relation to agriculture, the discussion revolved around the 
question of grain tariffs. At first, fairly benign contra-cyclical tariffs were put in place to 
protect Dutch arable farmers against price fluctuations. In 1835, a protectionist law was 
introduced in reaction to the cheap ‘black soil’ grain imports from Russia and Ukraine. At the 
same time, however, the argument for free trade was gathering strength. An open economic 
policy was perceived as crucial to maximize export opportunities for meat, butter, cheese, 
fruit and vegetables. When grain prices started to rise again, the potato blight epidemic 
caused serious food shortages and Britain abolished its Corn Laws, the Dutch protectionist 
laws were again repealed in 1847. The debate about economic policy was largely an 
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ideological one in which farmers themselves, except for the large arable farmers in the 
provinces of Zeeland and Groningen, played virtually no part (Vermeulen 1966: 9-28). 
 
From the 1840s onwards, the philosophy of free trade ushered in by the abolition of the Corn 
Laws was fully embraced by the Dutch government, and also determined its stance on 
agriculture. The initiative was with the private sector, and the government adhered to a 
rather strict laissez-faire policy. On a personal level, King William III was very interested in 
agriculture and tried to establish a national organization. However, his initiative failed due to 
a lack of support from farmers. The government limited its activities to putting in place the 
broad preconditions necessary for growth, such as general education, setting a good 
regulatory framework and creating the right physical parameters through the sale of land for 
reclamation and building an infrastructural network (Vermeulen 1966: 31-35).  
 
The government actively worked to unlock inland regions by building a network of railways 
(approx. 1840-1880), increased its role in reclamation efforts (e.g. Haarlemmermeer, the 
sandy soil regions in the east of the country and large parts of the Veenkoloniën), reformed 
taxation laws, established a general educational framework67 and facilitated the foundation 
of new types of organization such as cooperatives. One of the few special measures directed 
towards agriculture were the efforts to fight cattle diseases.68  
 
2.2.3 Facilitating policy: ‘Enlightened liberalism’ (1886-1930) 
The policy of laissez-faire began to be questioned when farmers started to feel the 
competitive challenge during the Great Agricultural Crisis (1876-1895) and to organize 
themselves on a national level. The concerted efforts of the agricultural sector and the 
perception that governments in surrounding countries like Germany, Belgium, France and 
Denmark (but not Great Britain) were actively and successfully supporting the development 
of their agricultural sectors began to soften the strict laissez-faire attitude of the Dutch 
government. The fear of an exodus from the countryside, a negative trade balance and 
potential harvest failures also contributed to a willingness to reassess the policy of ‘benign 
neglect’ towards agriculture and move to a more engaged and active policy. A recent 
extension of the franchise in 1887, which increased the political power of the agricultural 
population, also made Members of Parliament more keen to look after agricultural interests. 
 
Far reaching output-side policies in the form of protectionism, a road taken in France and 
Germany, was one of the options considered. Some agricultural societies from Dutch 
provinces that were dependent on arable farming, like Limburg and Groningen, lobbied for 
tariffs, while others, like the society from the provinces of Zuid-Holland and Noord-Holland, 
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where dairy farmers relied on cheap feed for their animals, argued for free trade. Outside 
agriculture, most voices called for free trade. One prominent Dutch economist argued that 
falling grain prices ‘were one of the most joyful events that future historians will record about 
our times’, another that ‘cheap bread is a blessing that cannot be appreciated enough.’  
 
Prominent politicians agreed. Pierson, later Prime Minster, argued that low grain prices 
would reduce the price of land, fostering greater equality in the countryside. Cort van der 
Linden, at that time a professor at the University of Groningen, argued that the crisis was a 
‘symptom of progress’ (Vermeulen 1966: 40-41). A third way was formulated by Sickesz. He 
argued that protection ‘kills all energy’ and ‘stands in the way of finding one’s own strength’ 
(Vermeulen 1966: 47). At the same time, however, he argued that farmers needed assistance 
to react adequately to the new challenges they were facing. Therefore, in his view, the 
government had a responsibility to educate farmers.  
 
In 1886, the state installed a committee, led by Sickesz, with the brief of investigating the 
depressed state of Dutch agriculture.69 The committee was active for four years. Its main 
conclusion was that, on the one hand, the Netherlands should maintain its policy of free trade 
and, on the other, it should step up its efforts to stimulate education, extension, research, 
systematic breeding and cooperation between farmers. To couch it in the terms of this paper: 
the state should refrain from most output policies (except for export promotion and quality 
control measures) and focus on input policies. The committee used the following expressive 
phrases to make this point:  
 
“State assistance is not something that may be relied upon in general, but in every single 
exceptional case, it is important to establish whether state intervention will have the desired 
effect, not in ceating or reviving by itself, but in safeguarding that which private initiative has 
wrought, and to keep alive that which has proven to be viable. Intervention by the state must 
therefore not become a prop to shore up decrepit and decaying forms of life; not ease the 
consequences of permanent causes, but it shall only be justifiable when it cuts off the root of 
evil and facilitates and prepares the way for healthy development and growth.”70 
 
On the initiative of the private regional agricultural societies, the first steps had been taken 
since the 1870s to build an organizational framework around agriculture that would 
stimulate development in different ways. The new attitude of the state significantly quickened 
the pace at which this framework was established. Education, extension and research became 
the three key areas in which the government tried to make a difference, leading to the 
introduction of the term OVO Drieluik, (Education, Extension and Research Triangle in the 
early 20th century. The OVO Drieluik served different goals, including the diffusion of 
innovations, improving hygiene and creating a collective quality standard for export 
products, and creating applied agricultural knowledge to improve productivity.  
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The means to achieve these goals ranged from practical courses to cattle breeding regulation 
and from product quality control to research at experiment stations. The state cooperated 
actively with the agricultural organizations, and especially the NLC, which was officially 
instated as an advisory organ of departments, provinces, municipalities and water boards in 
1893. From 1898, the government activities were directed from the newly established 
Directorate for Agriculture (Directoraat voor Landbouw). Civil servants at the Directorate 
undertook regular study trips abroad. As such, the new government activities were capable of 
tackling a wide range of problems with which Dutch farmers were confronted and facilitate 
development to overcome pressing competitive challenges. Some state activities and the 
process of their establishment are highlighted in more detail in the next section.  
 
From the 1890s until the 1920s, the activities of the state grew, with the gradual development 
of new regulations and consolidation of activities, but the nature of state policy did not 
change. The budget of the Directorate remained small,71 and market intervention was hardly 
even considered a serious option until the 1920s. However, a change in rhetoric from purely 
economic to a mix of social and economic concerns can be discerned already in the 1900s.  
 
When a new state committee was installed in 1906, the Minister of Agriculture, Industry and 
Trade clearly argued for a policy regime geared towards fair distribution of agricultural 
income whilst focusing on an economically healthy sector: ‘the state interference  (in 
agriculture) surely cannot be directed only towards attaining the highest possible 
development of production, but must also be aimed at a fair distribution of the fruits (of that 
production) among the agricultural population.’72  
 
Although distributive measures, such as land rent regulations, were not proposed yet, the 
work of the committee signalled the increasing willingness of the state to support the growing 
group of small farmers and agricultural labourers in the Netherlands. One of the areas in 
which state intervention made little progress was land reform, or what later came to be called 
‘structure policy’. With the rise of small farms, land had become increasingly fragmented, 
especially in the inland regions where smallholdings thrived. The earliest draft laws to 
stimulate land consolidation date from the early 20th century. In 1924 the Land Consolidation 
Act (Landinrichtingswet) was passed, but it had only minor effects on land ownership as a 
majority of stakeholders was needed in order to initiate a land consolidation project, and this 
majority was rarely achieved.73 
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2.2.4 Case study: the early development of knowledge policy for agriculture 
Agricultural education and extension rapidly developed in the first decades of the 20th 
century, thanks to the concerted efforts of the agricultural societies, farmers’ unions and the 
state. Lower and middle education was formalized in winter courses and lower and middle 
agricultural schools, with a curriculum geared towards specific target groups.74 In the late 
19th and early 20th century, students who had the ambition to continue their education were 
sent to German higher education institutes, where they were trained to become agricultural 
teachers, after the German example of the Wandellehrer. Paid by the state, these teachers, 
later known as ‘agricultural extension officers’, actively visited farmers and gave them advice 
in a wide range of ways on various topics. The first extension officers were hired in 1890, 
after which their number increased steadily and they each became more specialized and 
focused on a smaller area and number of farmers. 
 
Figure 2.4 Showing the development of the state extension efforts. A steady 
increase takes place between 1890 and 1920 and remains more or 
less constant until just before World War II. Immediately after 
World War II the number of state extension officers increases 
rapidly and remains constant until 1980. From the 1980s onwards, 
the number of state extension officers decreases significantly as a 
result of privatization 
 
 
Source: Zuurbier (1984: 85) 
 
Another important development for the Dutch agricultural knowledge infrastructure was the 
development of the agricultural college in Wageningen (1877). In 1904 the college was 
designated as an official state school, and expanded with the addition of departments for 
horticulture and forestry, as well as new research facilities.75 In 1918, Wageningen was 
officially designated as an institute for higher education. At that time it had 30 professors, 37 
other scientific personnel and 219 students, trained for agricultural employment in the 
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Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies. By then, the education was of high enough quality 
that it was no longer necessary to send students to Germany for higher education.  
 
Another development in which the Dutch government made significant headway was the 
foundation of agricultural experimental research stations. The first of these stations were 
established from midway through the 19th century in several European countries. In 1890, the 
Netherlands only had one station, in Wageningen, but the state stepped up its efforts and 
several more stations were established.76 The experiment stations were conceived as 
fundamental research institutes to increase agricultural knowledge, which would become 
available to all farmers and thereby increase the overall productivity of Dutch agriculture.  
 
The experiment stations were also to form the backbone of an extensive research 
infrastructure that was partly in the hands of the Directorate for Agriculture, partly in private 
hands and subsidized by the state. The knowledge acquired at the experiment stations would 
be diffused through experiment plots, gardens and farms. The system of experiment stations 
became very successful, as the facilities were intensively used by farmers. The fact that 
between 1889 and 1910 more than a thousand experiment plots were established illustrates 
this point.  
 
The original idea of this knowledge infrastructure was that the government would be 
responsible for the development and diffusion of knowledge, while experimentation with and 
diffusion of technological innovations would remain a task for the private agricultural 
organizations, which in turn would be facilitated and partially subsidized by the 
government.77 In practice, however, the different functions in the knowledge framework 
turned out to be very difficult to separate. For example, after a failed attempt to set up the 
experiment stations for both regulation and research, in 1910 it was decided that four 
experiment stations would focus on regulation,78 while the others would concentrate on 
specific areas of research: one for arable farming, one for dairy farming and later also one for 
forestry and one for poultry farming. The original scientific mission of the experiment 
stations was overshadowed by a pressing practical demand for regulation, testing and 
administration of inputs such as seeds and fertilizers, as well as agricultural output.79  
 
The demand-driven work of the experimental stations led to a fierce discussion about the 
scientific qualities of these institutions. Similar discussions surrounded the college in 
Wageningen, since it had officially been recognized as an institute for higher education. Some 
felt that the practically oriented departments of the institute should be transferred to a 
separate overarching organization for practical research, which was finally founded in 1932 
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as the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research, TNO (Nederlandse 
organisatie voor Toegepast-Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek). The professors in 
Wageningen, however, saw many advantages in their applied approach and close links with 
the sector. The genesis of the agricultural research infrastructure shows that the original 
linear model – from science to practice – envisioned by the state also did not fit the more 
interactive, and trial-and-error nature of the actual research process. Applied rather than 
fundamental research turned out to be in greatest demand during the first decades of active 
government agricultural knowledge policy.  
 
Regulation, facilitation of knowledge diffusion and quality testing were the most pressing 
concerns of farmers, who were greatly concerned with diseases, problems with their export 
reputation and knowledge about the new (expensive) inputs like seeds and fertilizers. The 
state, from the turn of the century embodied in the Directorate for Agriculture, was willing to 
listen to these concerns and facilitate farmers. This is also shown by the fact that not only the 
experiment stations, but also a number of specialized research and inspection stations,80 
state inspection services81 as well as state laws82 and state quality marks83 were established 
in that period. The state cooperated closely with agricultural societies and farmers’ unions, 
private companies84 and cooperatives.85 The initial goal of government policies was the 
development of a strong, healthy sector that was capable of competing on an international 
market.86  
 
2.3 Assessing the role of the state 
2.3.1 Causes of state intervention 
Having mentioned the most important state interventions in agriculture in the period 1795-
1930, this paper will now attempt to assess the consequences of those interventions. As 
discussed in this chapter, the role of the state in agriculture remained rather limited until the 
final decade of the 19th century. The first boost to agricultural policy around the year 1800, 
stemmed from a combination of intellectual ideas regarding the importance of agriculture 
that had sprung up in the late 18th century; the centralizing, reformist impulse emanating 
from the new state after years of decentralization; internal disagreement and inertia in the 
former Dutch Republic; and the special circumstances that resulted from the Napoleonic 
wars and the directives from France.  
 
The fact that the policies were not sustained is related to the lack of an organized and 
supportive sector as a counterpart to state policies, the lack of urgency as agriculture 
flourished midway the 19th century, and the ideology of laissez-faire that dominated the 
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subsequent period. In contrast, the state intervention in the late 19th century took place in the 
face of urgent competitive challenges to the agricultural sector as a result of the Great 
Agricultural Crisis, in the context of the integration of markets and the process of 
industrialization. The actions of the government were also the result of a more actively 
organized agricultural sector due to the development of cooperatives, societies and unions, 
which increased the effectiveness of and support for policies. Moreover, the Dutch economy 
offered the right conditions for rapid productivity growth, including increased availability of 
capital, agriculture-related industries and transportation possibilities. 
 
Many of the developments in Dutch agriculture and the government responses to them are 
strikingly similar to developments in surrounding countries in north-western Europe. These 
similarities (present in most but not all cases) include the increasing relative importance of 
livestock and horticulture and the rise of smallholders in the final decades of the 19th century; 
the founding of regional agricultural societies in the first half of the 19th century and of 
cooperatives and farmers’ unions around the turn of the 19th/20th century; the development 
of state research, extension and education facilities; the establishment of a directorate or 
ministry of agriculture; the founding of veterinary and agricultural colleges; and the 
introduction of quality control measures.  
 
However, in addition to these similarities there are also numerous differences in the nature, 
depth and timing of developments, related to specific economic and political constellations in 
the different countries. In north-western Europe, the agricultural development patterns in 
Denmark87 and Belgium88 are most similar to the pattern in the Netherlands. British 
agricultural development took a very different course due to the early industrialization of the 
British economy.89 The French90 and German91 (as well as Italian and Swedish92) cases 
reveal similarities with the Netherlands but also large differences, which can be partly 
explained by their large internal diversity and resultant different economic and political 
structure. Structural change in Southern and Eastern Europe took place much later, making 
historical comparison more complex,93 while the overseas cases (e.g. United States, Canada, 
Argentina, New Zealand, Australia, Brazil) are characterized by a very different initial 
situation of land abundance, which explains a large part of the different developmental paths 
there compared to Europe (Federico, 2005). 
 
Some specificities of the Dutch case stand out in an international context. Firstly, Dutch 
agriculture was very productive throughout the whole period. Only Britain (high labour 
productivity) and Belgium (high land productivity), which both shared the inheritance of a 
high level of urbanization and high productivity levels, and Denmark, which achieved 
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remarkable labour productivity increases throughout the 19th century due to far-reaching 
land reforms, were able to match the Dutch agricultural sector in terms of productivity 
throughout the period 1800-1930.  
 
Secondly, a rapid productivity increase can be observed in Dutch agriculture in the period 
1870-1910, matched only by Germany, Belgium and Denmark, while Great Britain fell behind 
(Van Zanden 1993; Van Zanden 1991: 215-239). Thirdly, Dutch agriculture stands out for 
employing an increasingly large number of farmers and labourers throughout the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, which also meant that a large agricultural electorate emerged. Fourthly, 
the Netherlands was producing surpluses of most agricultural products (except for cereals), 
which were destined for export. Agriculture was therefore an important source of national 
wealth, in a way only comparable to Denmark.  
 
With regard to the role of the state, the Netherlands was not the first nation to develop 
experiment stations, agricultural schools or a state extension service. It was also rather late 
with the development of interest representation on the national level and with the emergence 
of the various cooperatives. Many of the Dutch measures were modelled on Danish, British, 
French or German examples. The Netherlands, however, does stand out for the rapid and far-
reaching implementation of institutional reforms from 1886 onwards, and the strong and 
well-organized agricultural sector that emerged around the turn of the century.  
 
2.3.2 Effects of state intervention 
Compared to other sectors of the Dutch economy, the government took a proactive role in 
agriculture remarkably early and on a large scale.94 The government’s activities were not a 
necessary intervention in a passive and stagnant sector. Farmers had already begun to adapt 
to new circumstances in the decades before the state stepped in (exports rose, the first 
cooperatives and factories were established), but due to the small-scale nature of farming 
(family farms, smallholders) and the rapidly changing economic reality, more coordination 
was desirable. Thus, the state reacted to a request for help that came from the sector itself.  
 
Interestingly, the state took the side of farmers in the agro chain, as it stimulated the 
development of cooperatives to strengthen the market position of farmers vis-à-vis suppliers 
and purchasers. However, the role of the state should also not be overstated. The fact that 
positive changes took place rapidly from the 1890s onwards had as much to do with the 
waning of the agricultural crisis (leading to higher availability of capital) as with the help 
from the state. Just as important as the actions of the state were those of other actors, 
including the regional societies, farmers’ unions, cooperatives and commercial parties with a 
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stake in agriculture. The government’s actions took place in a broader institutional 
framework in which these other forces and actors also operated, and were at least as much 
the result of practical experience gained through trial and error as of conscious and directive 
top-down planning.  
 
Although the effects of state intervention in agriculture should not be overstated, agricultural 
policies clearly contributed to the development of agriculture in a specific direction. The 
policies contributed to solving some of the most urgent problems farmers were facing. The 
decision was taken not to ease the competitive pressure by protecting Dutch agriculture. This 
meant that farmers had to face the competitive challenge by specializing in profitable niche 
markets, achieving high productivity and building on comparative advantages. As a result, a 
structural change took place, from the increasingly unprofitable arable sector to the booming 
livestock and horticultural sector.95  
 
The state agricultural policies facilitated this shift, and were especially helpful to small 
farmers, who were given the means to fully exploit the possibilities of the export market. The 
facilitation of farmers’ organizations and cooperatives improved the market position of small 
farmers; inspections, quality marks, research and education improved the tarnished export 
reputation of Dutch agricultural products, and cooperatives, education, extension and 
research ensured the application of new technologies, including the use of artificial fertilizers. 
Small farmers also gained a stronger position in politics, through the extension of the 
franchise, and better representation through agricultural societies and farmers’ unions. As a 
result, a well-organized and large group of farmers developed, with a collective identity and 
operating in a strong institutional framework.  
 
State intervention in agriculture has often been described as a success. As early as 1906, the 
German agricultural economist Julius Frost wrote an admiring account of Dutch agriculture, 
Agrarverfassung und Landwirtschaft in den Niederlanden. In 1921, the Wageningen 
professor Salomon Koenen wrote that:  
 
With state intervention, a new era has begun for our entire agricultural sector. Not only 
because of state intervention: that would not have been possible. But at the same time, a new 
spirit has caught the Dutch farming sector, a spirit of energy, determination and courage, and 
also a spirit of cooperation that has overtaken the old, ultra-individualistic spirit.96  
 
In a classical comparative thesis on government and agriculture, Michael Tracy (1989: 3-118) 
argues that the success of Dutch and Danish agriculture in the early 20th century is to be 
understood as the result of the maintenance of free trade despite the agricultural crisis in the 
late 19th century, which opened the way for the shift from arable farming to livestock and 
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horticulture (with its relatively higher land productivity and based on cheap inputs, including 
imported grains) to take place. Free trade policy was successfully combined with supportive 
government measures. On the other hand, German and French agriculture was held back by 
protectionist tariffs which eased the competitive challenge and removed incentives for 
change.  
 
As a result, farmers in these countries continued to rely on cereals and made only modest 
productivity gains. The British case is an example of pure free trade combined with 
government neglect, resulting in a collapse of the agricultural sector and an exodus from the 
land. Only a few large, labour-extensive farms were able to survive in the face of harsh 
international competition. Although this decline in British agriculture was cushioned by the 
availability of employment for former farm labourers in the urban industries, and by cheap 
food and raw material imports, it lead to the decline of British ‘high farming’, admired in the 
19th century for its high level of mechanization and profitability. Tracy argues that the 
‘positive response’ of the Dutch and Danish states, combining free trade with policy that 
faced the competitive challenge and was geared to boosting competitiveness, has had the 
most positive results, compared to the ‘negative (protectionist) reaction’ in France and 
Germany, and the neglect in Great Britain: 
 
“Denmark and the Netherlands showed the possibility of meeting the crisis by adapting the 
pattern of agricultural production to the new situation, and thereby laid the basis for a 
prosperous agriculture making an important contribution to export earnings and to general 
economic progress.” (Tracy 1989: 26). 
 
Tracy’s conclusions come close to the initial objectives of Dutch policymakers in the period 
up to 1930, as formulated by Sickesz in 1886, and fit with the common-sense idea that too 
much competition stifles, too little competition breeds complacency, and the state should 
facilitate a fruitful middle way. However, some criticism can be mounted against this 
conclusion. First, the empirical evidence is not entirely supportive. Koning (2007: 204) refers 
to figures from Jan Luiten van Zanden which show that Germany, which Tracy puts in the 
protectionist category, was actually characterized by rapid productivity increases. A similar 
argument could be made for Belgium which, despite moderate protectionism, also prospered, 
although falling behind somewhat after 1910. In fact, both Germany and Belgium developed a 
strong institutional framework to develop agriculture, including a knowledge infrastructure 
and quality control measures, on top of the protectionist measures.  
 
Secondly, it is questionable to what extent the different economies discussed by Tracy can be 
usefully compared: they were highly interdependent (the Netherlands fulfilling the role of 
supplying the British and German industrial centres with food and some raw materials) and 
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policy choices were strongly influenced by local factors. The Dutch and Danish economies 
specialized in the delivery of foodstuffs and raw materials for industrial processing and 
consumption, while Britain did the opposite. Belgium aimed for self-sufficiency, while rural 
policies in France and Germany were deeply influenced by political rather than economic 
factors. In addition to the late-19th-century policies, other factors, including politics, initial 
conditions and timing of industrialization, also largely explain the different developmental 
paths.  
 
Nevertheless, Tracy’s key point that Dutch agricultural policy in the late 19th and early 20th 
century provided an effective developmental response to a pressing competitive environment 
fits the story told in this chapter. On the other hand, although the positive effects of Dutch 
state intervention in agriculture are clear, there are also some obvious downsides to the 
policy direction taken that need to be taken into account.  
 
First, the increasing importance of exports made Dutch agriculture more vulnerable to 
changes in the international market, while Belgian farmers, who focused on the domestic 
market, were not so dependent on capricious and unpredictable international developments. 
Secondly, the ‘peasant-friendly’ policies, focusing on land-saving (rather than labour-saving) 
innovations and stimulating the development of smallholdings, led to the emergence of a 
fragmented sector with clear limits to its potential for further productivity growth. In other 
words, the labour-intensive growth path would at some point face limits (a ‘small-farmers’ 
problem’ – as acknowledged in the 1930s) and necessitate a considerable outflow of labour 
from the sector (as happened after the Second World War, see Chapter 3).  
 
Thirdly, the fact that the government listened to and cooperated with farmers’ organizations 
led to the development of a well-organized, powerful farming lobby which on the one hand 
improved coordinated implementation of policies, but on the other gave the organized 
farmers considerable power to influence current and future policy decisions to ensure it was 
in line with their own interests and ideas and therefore instigated at least some degree of 
policy inertia (also see Chapter 3). This fact would render agricultural policy more rigid and 
less adaptable to changing circumstances in later periods. Overall, it can be argued that the 
success of Dutch agricultural policies in the period described above was based on the premise 
that a large and economically healthy agricultural sector was desirable. However, as the next 
chapters will make clear, this premise is not fully justified in the long run.  
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Figure 2.5 Land and labour productivity in British, Belgian and Danish 
agriculture compared to that of the Netherlands in the period 1870-
1985 
 
 
Source: Van Zanden (1993: 364-65) 
 
 
3 THE STATE DIRECTS DEVELOPMENT (1930-PRESENT) 
 
3.1 The agro sector: challenges and responses 
3.1.1 Historical context and key trends 
Since the 1930s, and especially since the end of the Second World War, the world economy 
has changed on an unprecedented scale. Processes of global integration of markets and 
industrialization have shifted to a higher gear, GDP per capita in Western countries has 
soared and population numbers have boomed. Since the 1970s, however, the reality of the 
limits to growth and issues relating to the sustainability of production systems have radically 
changed our ideas about future economic development. All of this has fundamentally affected 
the place occupied by agriculture in the wider economy and society.  
The Depression in the 1930s marked a turning point for agriculture. With national and 
international markets collapsing, farmers were confronted with rapidly declining demand 
and faced a serious profitability crisis. The crisis was sparked off by a specific set of 
conditions that lay largely outside the agro sector. However, the roots of the severe impact of 
the 1930s crisis on agriculture are also to be found in the structural changes in production in 
the agro sector that had taken place in the preceding half-century. There had been 
extraordinary growth in agricultural production, not just in the Netherlands or Europe, but 
on a global scale.97 Products like butter, sugar and grain were now produced and traded 
worldwide. Additionally, the supply of cheap substitutes for agricultural products (margarine, 
synthetic fibres and dyes, petroleum) increased.  
 
Generally speaking, although demand for agro products had grown rapidly, this growth was 
outstripped by the even stronger growth in demand for other (industrial) products and 
services. Food had become an increasingly marginal expenditure for most inhabitants of the 
developed world and, in a context of rising living standards, prices of agricultural products 
stagnated relative to other products, and especially the most basic consumption goods such 
as wheat or milk. As overall income level were rising quickly, the terms of trade for farmers 
worsened (figure 3.1 illustrates this point).98  
 
A key strategy for farmers to survive under these conditions was to increase their labour 
productivity by cutting costs or increasing the volume of production. In practice, it was only 
by increasing production that farmers were able to achieve incomes comparable to those in 
other sectors and remain competitive on international markets. A classic problem is the fact 
that, as long as no labour flows out of the sector, this incentive to produce leads to a vicious 
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cycle: as supply grows, markets saturate further and prices for agricultural products are 
squeezed even more. Whereas many sectors, including agro-processing and retail went 
through a process of mergers, a similar process only took place in agriculture after the 
Second World War.  
 
Figure 3.1 Development of the price of labour in agriculture, milk and wheat 
in the period 1950–1990. The relative increase in the price of 
labour (i.e. labour costs and farmers’ incomes) in relation to the 
price of basic agricultural commodities becomes strikingly clear. 
This fact explains a large part of the labour-saving developments in 
agriculture in the period after the Second World War 
 
 
Source: Bieleman (2010) 
 
3.1.2 Achieving higher labour productivity 
The agro sector, and agriculture specifically, reacted to the new economic conditions it had 
faced since the 1930s: whereas the total number of people employed in agriculture had risen 
for centuries, it now began to decline. The share of agriculture in the total added value in the 
Dutch economy has declined steeply in recent decades, from approximately 15 per cent of 
total national income in the late 1940s to under 2 per cent today (Van Bruchem and Silvis 
2005: 18). In absolute terms, the size of the Dutch agricultural workforce reached its peak in 
the first two decades of the 20th century, remained stable during the Depression and the 
Second World War and then began to shrink quickly and persistently, from over 600,000 
just after the War (one fifth of the total labour force) to less than 200,000 today (only a small 
percentage of the total labour force; see figure 2.3).  
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This outflow of labour was a multifaceted process. Some farmers scaled up their individual 
production, cut costs (especially labour wages) and became successful, independent and well-
educated entrepreneurs. The fact that an increasingly small numbers of farmers managed to 
achieve high production of good quality at relatively low cost is largely explained by the 
numerous innovations in farm practice. New technologies had been developed in the first half 
of the 20th century and were still in the process of refinement. When the conditions were 
right, and through coordinated efforts, these technologies could now be implemented on a 
large scale. In the decades after the Second World War, the tractor quickly replaced the horse 
as the most important source of power, numerous innovations were adopted in dairy farming 
(such as the cooling tank and milking machine), the harvesting of sugar beet, potatoes and 
green maize was mechanized and new stalls and greenhouses boosted output in horticulture 
and livestock farming.  
 
While parts of the developing world experienced a ‘green revolution’ in the 1950s and 1960s 
with the expansion of high-yielding varieties and artificial fertilizers, the amount and quality 
of inputs used in agriculture in the Netherlands, and the developed world more broadly, also 
expanded rapidly. The process of productivity increase as a result of new techniques, 
technologies and inputs was especially remarkable in the first post-war decades. In the words 
of Dutch agricultural historian Jan Bieleman: after the 1950s, ‘farming became agri-
business’.99  
 
The success of agricultural entrepreneurs is reflected by the fact that the growth of labour 
productivity in agriculture was actually stronger than in services and industry, so that the 
productivity gap compared with these sectors that had reached problematic proportions in 
the 1930s was already closing in the 1960s.100 In recent decades, the development of new 
technologies and related gains in labour productivity has stagnated somewhat (see figure 
3.2). However, as this is a more general international development, Dutch agriculture still 
remains among the most productive and innovative in the world. 
 
There was also a flipside to these rapid productivity gains. In the process of labour outflow, 
many farmers had no option other than to give up their business and sell the farm to which 
their families had been attached for generations and which had not just been a source of 
income, but also a house, home and lifestyle.101 At present, despite the fact that farmers have 
begun to broaden their activities, a large number remain unable to continue their business or 
to find a successor, and the number of farm holdings continues to decline in a rapid pace.102 
Another flipside of rapid productivity growth was the neglect of the environmental impact, 
something which is discussed in more detail below.  
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Figure 3.2 Labour productivity growth in Dutch agriculture in the period 
1950-2005. Labour productivity growth was especially rapid in the 
1960s and 1970s and slowed considerably from 1990 onwards 
 
 
Source: Van Bruchem and Silvis (2008: 62) 
 
Figure 3.3 The scaling up process in Dutch agriculture in the period 1950–
2010. Both in terms of output per hectare and number of hectares 
per farm, a steady increase can be observed, leading to dramatic 
growth in the total output per farm. At the same time, the amount 
of labour per farm has barely increased, indicating that the output 
per unit of labour has risen rapidly as well 
 
 
Source: Van Berkhout and Van Bruchem (2008: 40) 
 
Despite the rise in productivity and per capita production in agriculture, farming largely 
retained its family-oriented business model, in contrast to most other links in the agro chain 
which came to be dominated by a few large firms with a large number of employees. The 
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seed, feed and fertilizer business, as well as the processing, distribution and retail sector, 
have become concentrated in the hands of a few powerful international players such as OCI 
Agro (formerly DSM Agro), Unilever, Heineken and Ahold. Moreover, the inputs industry, 
processing industry and distribution sector have increased their share in the agro value 
chain, while increasingly relying on imported raw materials (such as fodder, cocoa, barley, 
hops and oils) and foods. The growing importance of these players in the agro sector is 
illustrated by the fact that employment as well as value added as a share of GDP in the agro 
sector as a whole has fallen much less steeply than in agriculture, from just over 20 percent of 
the total economy in 1960 to 10 percent today.103  
 
Around the year 1970, the share of ‘agro-business’ in total GDP began to exceed the share of 
agriculture itself.104 It is also worth noting that the further internationalization of markets 
and chains of production disentangled the Dutch agriculture and the Dutch agro sector. In 
1970, approximately two-thirds of Dutch agricultural production ended up in the Dutch food 
industry, while around the turn of the century this share had declined to only one third.  
While the Dutch food industry was increasingly importing its raw foodstuffs from abroad, 
Dutch agricultural products ended up in different places.105 An important effect of the 
industrialization and internationalization of the agro chain and the increased power of large 
players (especially retail and the processing industry) has been to exert even greater pressure 
on farmers to sell their products at competitive prices.  
 
3.1.3 Finding international markets 
In 1930, the Netherlands was among the key agricultural exporters in Europe. Not only did it 
account for a disproportionately large share of international agricultural trade, but the Dutch 
sector was also strongly geared towards export, and agricultural exports contributed 
significantly to total exports. The Depression in the 1930s seriously challenged the export-
oriented nature of Dutch agriculture as demand diminished and prices plummeted.  
 
Nevertheless, the sector and government worked hard to design measures geared towards 
maintaining the specialized and intensive character of the agricultural sector that was 
required for export (see next section). After the Second World War this strategy paid off, as 
export opportunities returned. In these post-war decades, Dutch farmers were able to profit 
from excellent export conditions in a partly protected European market which at that point 
was still characterized by an export deficit.  
 
It is well known that European agricultural markets have become saturated over recent 
decades and the growth in production for export has stagnated (see figure 3.4). Despite this, 
38 
the Netherlands has retained its position as a key agricultural exporter. The following 
statistics illustrate this point. The share of agricultural production destined for export rose 
from 45 per cent of total agricultural production in 1950 to 55-60 per cent in 1970 and 75 per 
cent in 1995, after which the export dependency stabilized at just under 75 per cent (Van 
Zanden 1986: 88; Van Bruchem and Silvis 2011: 23). The relative importance of agricultural 
exports in total Dutch exports steadily decreased but remains significant. In 1950, 46 per cent 
of total Dutch exports consisted of agricultural products, and these products currently still 
account for approximately 15 per cent of exports, not including agro-related products like 
fertilizers, vaccines, beer and chocolate (Douw and Post 2000: 12). 
 
Moreover, the agricultural trade balance has remained positive throughout, with unprocessed 
horticultural products such as bulbs, flowers and plants and processed livestock products 
including meat, eggs and dairy as the most important export products. Most Dutch 
agricultural exports end up on the European market, most notably Germany.106  
 
Figure 3.4 Degree of self-sufficiency in a number of key agricultural products 
in the European Community (EC-6 and EC-9) and the weighted 
aggregate of Dutch agricultural self-sufficiency in various years 
over the period 1956-1981. The figures shows a shift towards self-
sufficiency in the 1970s and 1980s, despite an enlargement of the 
Community. Despite shortfalls in cereals, fruit and fodder, the 
Netherlands was a surplus country throughout the whole period 
thanks to large surpluses of potatoes, sugar, vegetables, dairy, meat 
and eggs 
 
 
Sources: Meester and Strijker (1985: 37) and Burger (1993: 109) 
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As noted in the preceding chapter on the pre-1930 period, one response of Dutch agriculture 
to international market integration was to shift away from arable production to livestock and 
horticulture. After a temporary return to arable farming in the 1930s and during the Second 
World War as a result of the specific circumstances, in the post-war period the structural shift 
from relatively extensive arable to intensive livestock and horticultural farming resumed (see 
figure 2.2), although some arable sectors (most notably sugar beet and potatoes) remained 
important, as did dairy farming, which was more profitable and intensive than arable 
farming, but less so than pig and poultry farming and horticulture.  
 
The general trend was that markets for livestock and horticultural products still offered 
potential for growth, while markets for arable (and dairy) products were extremely 
competitive (and due to their land-intensive character, not very suitable for Dutch 
conditions). To ease some of the competitive pressure on arable and dairy farmers and to 
ensure their continuation in the light of food security concerns, market and pricing policies 
were put in place, first on a national level and later on a European level. No such protection 
was provided for pig and poultry farmers or horticulturalists, who continued to be faced by a 
competitive challenge, having to survive in an open and competitive international market 
(see next section).  
 
Dutch farmers managed to claim a considerable share of regulated markets for products like 
starch potatoes, sugar beet and milk, building on their international competitiveness in terms 
of productivity. However, many farmers specialized in the growth markets for poultry, pig 
and horticultural products. As a result, a very efficient, internationally competitive and large-
scale ‘footloose’ horticultural and livestock sector developed. To illustrate the magnitude of 
this development: the total number of pigs in the Netherlands rose from 1,9 million in 1950 
to a peak of 14,3 million in 1987, while the poultry stock rose from 23,5 million to 96,8 
million animals (Van Zanden and Verstegen 1993: 85).  
 
The concentration of production is illustrated by the fact that the average number of pigs per 
holding rose from 7 to 700 between 1950 and 1997, while the number of chickens per holding 
rose from 100 to more than 21.000 in that same period (Douw and Post 2000: 25). The 
number of animals per holding continues to rise today. The horticultural sector has also 
rapidly increased its production in the last three decades, increasing its share in total 
agricultural production from 23 per cent in 1980 to 45 per cent in 2010. The value added in 
floriculture (flowers, plants, bulbs and trees), in particular, has increased significantly. 
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One way to measure the relative success of Dutch agricultural entrepreneurs in terms of 
productivity is by looking at their competitiveness in international markets. Based on a 
methodology developed by Michael Porter, Jacobs, Boekholt and Zegveld (1990: 29) 
calculated that in 1986 for 11 agro products, the Netherlands had a share in total world trade 
of more than 30 per cent (!), illustrating the competitive strength of the Dutch sector.107 
These shares have decreased somewhat since then, but Dutch agricultural exports have 
remained important in the world market. Snijders, Vrolijk and Jacobs (2007) calculated that 
in 2005, of the 100 most competitive Dutch export sectors, more than half were agro-related, 
and that the Dutch share of cut flowers, mussels, potatoes, cocoa, pigs and animal vaccines 
still added up to over 25 per cent of total world trade in these commodities throughout the 
1990s and 2000s.108  
 
The concept of ‘footloose farming’ serves well to illustrate the strengths and limitations of the 
Dutch situation: ‘footloose farmers’ were no longer dependent on scarce and expensive 
land109 and fickle environmental conditions, but on the availability of external inputs and on 
the technology and management skills needed to build and regulate artificial stables and 
greenhouses. Footloose farming developed particularly in the urbanized coastal regions 
(horticulture) and in the southern sandy soils which were traditionally characterized by 
smallholdings (pig and poultry). The growth of the livestock (especially pig and poultry) 
sector was also stimulated by the fact that duty-free feedstuffs could be imported through the 
Port of Rotterdam.  
 
This so-called ‘Rotterdam Loophole’ had developed as a result of concessions given to the 
United States in the early 1960s in the wake of the establishment of a regulated European 
market for agricultural products. Due to their proximity to the Port of Rotterdam, Dutch 
intensive livestock farmers on the southern sandy soils were blessed with an extra 
competitive advantage. The growth of the horticultural sector was also boosted by the 
discovery of large natural gas deposits in the northeast of the Netherlands (Slochteren). 
Energy-intensive sectors, in which glasshouse horticulture (as well as production of 
fertilizers) figured prominently, were able to profit from cheap energy. 
 
Despite the competitiveness of the Dutch agro sector, a continuation of export success cannot 
be taken for granted. In recent decades, the intensive livestock and horticultural sector have 
faced new problems, resulting from difficulties in adapting to the new sustainability 
challenges. A large manure surplus built up due to the growing intensive livestock sector, 
leading to environmental problems, social outrage and strict regulations in the 1980s,, 
effectively curbing further expansion of the sector (Termeer 1993; Frouws 1994) Disease 
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epidemics such as mad cow disease, foot-and-mouth disease, swine fever and avian influenza 
have not only hit the livestock sector hard in recent decades, but also posed a real danger to 
human health. The horticultural sector has been criticized for its high energy use and 
dependence on cheap (foreign) labour. The vulnerable export reputation of the horticultural 
export sector was exposed in the 1990s, when Dutch tomatoes were nicknamed 
Wasserbombe (water bombs) by German consumers for their tastelessness.  
 
In the late 1980s, the term Dutching, which had been used to describe the adulteration of 
Dutch agricultural products in the late 19th century, re-emerged (Krajenbrink 2005, 324). 
Health dangers remain a key concern for international trade: in 2012 the trade in fresh 
vegetables collapsed due to the alleged discovery of EHEC-bacteria on vegetables of Dutch 
origin. Similar disease-related crises have struck the livestock sector. Besides such incidents, 
the Dutch horticultural and livestock sectors also have to cope with increasing low-cost 
foreign competition, for example from producers in China or Latin American countries, and 
the prospects for the future remain uncertain.  
 
3.1.4 Sustainable production? 
The era between 1945 and 1973 is often referred to as the ‘golden age of European economic 
growth’. An awareness that there were limits to economic and demographic growth generally, 
and to agricultural growth specifically, was yet to develop. Achieving economic growth and 
appropriate levels of income for the workforce were central concerns, while overproduction 
as well as the negative consequences of production increases were largely neglected. 
Agriculture was considered a key sector as it was vital to food security and held the key to 
putting an end to hunger and misery. Society generally took a positive view of agriculture.  
 
Agriculture was mostly seen as a sector that was confronted with competitive challenges, 
which could be remedied by stepping up efforts to achieve technical advancement and 
productivity increases. The belief in the importance of agricultural growth was reflected in 
the execution of large-scale land consolidation projects, the use of large amounts of pesticides 
and fertilizers and the focus on technical aspects in agricultural research. Nature, on which 
agricultural production (or any production for that matter) obviously largely depends, was 
generally perceived as benign and versatile.  
 
The first problem that confronted the ‘growth paradigm’ in agriculture were the surpluses of 
products like butter and milk that began to appear in the 195os. The earliest warning signs of 
the negative side-effects of pesticide use date from the early 1960s,110 and those regarding 
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manure surpluses from the late 1960s.111 Of monumental importance was the report Limits to 
Growth (1972) by the Club of Rome, which ushered in a new public and political 
consciousness about the relationship between humans and natural resources. The visible 
agricultural surpluses of the 1970s and 1980s and their negative consequences also became a 
widely discussed topic. The surplus problem was at least partially solved in the 1980s and 
1990s, but since the 1970s a whole string of new issues has emerged. Ecosystems, animals 
and landscapes have come to be appreciated as more than a source of agricultural 
production, and consumers have developed a demand for a diverse and tasty supply of 
agricultural products.  
 
In recent decades, recurring outbreaks of animal disease have again focused attention on the 
limits to growth in agriculture. Agriculture has also increasingly been seen as a sector that 
upholds cultural-historical and landscape values, rather than pure economic value. These 
new perspectives on agriculture can be summed up in the overarching assertion that 
agricultural supply was no longer accepted as being of intrinsic importance in itself. Instead, 
farmers and other players in the agro chain have had to focus more on the demand side and 
develop more sensitivity to the variety of wishes, tastes and values of consumers and citizens.  
 
The agricultural sector was relatively late to acknowledge the newly discovered limitations 
and had to be forced by external pressure from the media, civil society and politics to reduce 
its impact on the environment and acknowledge the limitations set by society at large. Total 
agricultural production in the Netherlands (in terms of units of production and to a lesser 
extent value of production) continued to increase in absolute terms until the 1980s, after 
which it stagnated.112 The environmental impact of agriculture also began to decrease from 
the 1980s onwards. The number of animals, the output of manure and the amount of 
pesticides have been limited.  
 
In reaction to these new restricting conditions, some farmers have begun to diversify their 
sources of income and to step off the bandwagon of continued production and productivity 
increase. For example, the number of organic farms increased to 1.8 percent of the total 
number of farming operations in 2010.113 Approximately 15 per cent of all farms currently 
extend their income with extra activities.114 Nonetheless, diversification of income and 
organic farms remains rather marginal, and the process of scaling up the average farm size 
continues today.115  
 
The hesitation in the sector to reform in the face of new sustainability challenges has given 
agriculture a rather negative reputation in Dutch society (Broersma 2011). The tense 
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relationship between the agricultural sector and its natural and social environment remains a 
hotly debated topic today.116 The future course of agriculture remains controversial, as some 
speak of a crisis and call for a fundamental reorientation, while others point to the success of 
past productivity increases and the need to continue on this path against the backdrop of a 
world population that continues to grow. 117 
 
Figure 3.5 The production of manure and milk, the number of cattle and the 
amount of pesticides used in the Netherlands in the period 1950-
2000. A clear reversal from growth to stagnation and decrease can 
be observed in the 1980s for all four indicators. The decrease in the 
cattle stock and stagnation of milk production are the consequence 
of the milk quotas introduced in 1984, the reduction in the cattle 
stock and in manure production are the consequence of manure 
laws introduced from 1984 onwards, and the reduction in pesticide 
use is the result of increasing social and political pressure on 
farmers to limit their negative impact on the environment 
 
 
Sources: CBS Statline, Bieleman (2010) and Krajenbrink (2005: 322-24) 
 
The period from 1930 to the present is characterized first by an increasing organizational 
density in the agricultural sector and an alignment of interests, followed by a disintegration 
and fragmentation from the 1980s onwards. The collective agricultural organizations that 
had been established by 1920 long retained their position as major forces in the agricultural 
sector, as did cooperatives and the increasingly interwoven research, extension and education 
institutes. From the 1950s onwards, the collective organizations aligned their interests 
through a new semi-public organization, the Agricultural Board, that was established after 
the Second World War. Product chains were organized with vertical commodity boards.  
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Throughout, critical farmers have spoken out against the overarching organizations 3.1.5. 
Institutional changes in the sector and founded their own. Despite this, large sections of the 
agro sector, and especially the agricultural sector, had organized rather effectively until most 
of its organizational framework collapsed in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
The crisis policies of the 1930s and the wartime policies during the Second World War made 
farmers and farm labourers more aware of their reliance on the institutional framework in 
which they operated. An increasing percentage of farmers subscribed to one of the existing 
collective agricultural organizations (see chapter 2). The need for well-coordinated sectoral 
cooperation was also reflected in the foundation of new organizations. The 1930s crisis 
policies and the food supply measures taken during the Second World War necessitated an 
organized sector and an intensified relationship with the state. To this end, a considerable 
number of crisis foundations were established in the 1930s and 1940s.  
 
After the War, the rapid adoption of innovations and the changing structure of the 
agricultural sector required effective coordination. The Foundation for Agriculture (Stichting 
voor de Landbouw) was established in 1945, a collective agricultural foundation in which the 
different farmers’ and farm labourers’ organizations cooperated. In 1954, an even more 
powerful collective organization was founded: the Agricultural Board (Landbouwschap), 
comprising the three collective agricultural organizations as well as the different unions of 
farm labourers. All farmers were obliged to become affiliated. The Agricultural Board was a 
‘horizontal organization’, representing the agricultural sector as a whole, while numerous 
‘commodity boards’ (productschappen), ‘vertical organizations’, represented the production 
chains for individual products (poultry, horticulture, dairy, etc.).  
 
Cooperatives harmonized their interests and founded the National Cooperative Council 
(Nationale Coöperatieve Raad) in 1934. They also went through a process of scaling up and 
concentration. The number of cooperatives decreased from thousands to just a few. Those 
that remained grew enormously in size through mergers and acquisitions. Well-known 
examples of cooperatives that experienced a long history of mergers and acquisitions and 
became large players include Avebe (potato starch), FrieslandCampina (dairy) and Rabobank 
(credit) (Strijker 2008; Van Bruchem and Silvis 2005: 38; Sluyterman et al. 1998). Farmers’ 
organizations and cooperatives have also organized themselves on a European level. National 
farmers’ organizations are represented by COPA (Committee of Professional Agricultural 
Organisations, founded in 1958) and cooperatives by COGETA (General Confederation of 
Agricultural Cooperatives, 1959).118  
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The horizontal and vertical boards (schappen) can best be described as ‘corporatist’. They 
were in fact public organizations with regulatory powers, but they mostly functioned as 
representative organizations of the sector they represented. Boards were installed at a time 
when the economy was highly regulated. The idea was that they would be implemented 
throughout the Dutch economy, with the aim of achieving a high level of industrial 
organization with only limited government interference. Although they barely spread at all in 
other sectors, the Agricultural Board functioned rather well as a platform for agricultural 
cooperation. The success of the Agricultural Board is explained by the fact that the idea of 
sectoral responsibility outside the direct orbit of the state resonated in the agricultural sector, 
which cherished both its independence and its political influence. The Board became a 
powerhouse, with an influential political network and close direct connections to the Minister 
of Agriculture. The commodity boards took up the tasks of implementing regulations, 
streamlining cooperation and marketing products in specific agricultural production chains.  
 
Underlying the actions of the Agricultural Board and its institutional predecessors was the 
assumption that the agricultural sector had more or less uniform interests that could be 
represented adequately by a collective organization. The Agricultural Board endorsed the 
modernization of Dutch agriculture and saw the growth of production and productivity as a 
necessary development for the Dutch agricultural sector. However, not all farmers felt 
represented. As early in the 1930s, a critical fourth large agricultural organization, 
‘Agriculture and Society’ (Landbouw en Maatschappij) developed in reaction to the emerging 
crisis laws and policies (see next section). At its height in the late 1930s, this organization 
represented more than 10 percent of all organized farmers, before moving to the extreme 
right and losing much of its legitimacy (Krajenbrink, 2005: 21). Criticism re-emerged in the 
1950s and 1960s, when the Agricultural Board received harsh criticism from a group of 
independent farmers who refused to go along with the obligations imposed by the Board.119  
 
These farmers called themselves ‘Free Farmers’ (Vrije Boeren), a movement led by Hendrik 
‘Boer’ (‘Farmer’) Koekoek, who was also the leader of the rightist populist ‘Farmers’ Party’ 
(Boerenpartij), which occupied seats in the Dutch parliament from 1963 to 1981. This 
movement, however, never outgrew its marginal position in agricultural interest 
representation. 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the representation of farmers in an increasingly complex 
environment became more difficult. The Agricultural Board operated under increasing 
pressure from various quarters, both internally and externally. Social conflicts between 
farmers and farm labourers, represented by their own organizations in the Board, became 
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more tense. The legitimacy of the Board was affected by the fact that farmers themselves were 
much more highly educated than in the 1950s and had a more individualistic outlook, while 
the sector as a whole had become more diverse and difficult to categorize and manage as a 
whole.  
 
Moreover, top-down innovation was no longer as effective as it had been, the focus on 
production and productivity growth was no longer universally accepted, and sustainability 
challenges were imposed on the sector from outside. The latter laid bare the problematic dual 
role that the Agricultural Board played as both a representative sectoral organization and a 
regulatory body that was supposed to represent the public interest. Also problematic was the 
fact that the Agricultural Board had no counterparts in other European countries, which 
complicated its position in the framework of increasing European cooperation.  
 
Ultimately the above changes led to a serious legitimacy problem for the Board, vis-à-vis both 
farmers and society, and finally to its demise and abolition in the 1990s. At the same time, 
the three collective agricultural organizations had merged as the Dutch Agricultural and 
Horticultural Organization (Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie Nederland – LTO) in 1995. The 
LTO has also experienced the difficulties of formulating a clear and uniform course and its 
short history has been characterized by internal struggles (Broersma 2010). The commodity 
boards, which have played a less controversial role, continue to exist today, although their 
legitimacy has been repeatedly challenged and abolition seems near.  
 
3.2 The state: policy regimes and instruments  
Compared to earlier periods, the Dutch state began to play a more central role in the 
development of Dutch agriculture from the 1930s onwards. According to agricultural 
historian Jan Bieleman, the legislation that was enacted in the 1930s signified a ‘key turning 
point in the relationship between farmer and government’ because ‘since then, the state has 
never released its hold on agriculture’ (Bieleman 2008: 314).120 While state policies had 
already facilitated input-side development of agriculture since the late 19th century (see 
chapter 2), these policies were supplemented by output-side market interventions in the 
1930s, and were themselves strongly intensified in the post-war decades. As such, the state 
both intensified its efforts to help the sector cope with competitive challenges, and attempted 
to ease some of the competitive pressure by intervening on the output side. To achieve its 
aims, the state cooperated closely with sectoral organizations. In general, the role of the state 
became much more directive and forceful in the 1930s and the post-war decades. 
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From the 1970s onwards, the social, ecological and economic sustainability challenges that 
confronted the agricultural sector and society as a whole introduced a new dynamic into the 
sector-state relationship. The close cooperation within the sector disintegrated, and the state 
took a more distanced, corrective role. It could no longer afford to have as close a relationship 
with the sector as it had before, since the state was now expected to represent wider public 
values that often clashed with the narrower agricultural interests. Moreover, the earlier 
strategy of top-down coordinated development no longer brought the hoped-for benefits. The 
state had to re-evaluate its strategies in supporting the competitiveness of the agricultural 
sector. Economic conditions had changed, and the potential for development no longer lay 
mainly in the adoption, adjustment and upscaling of existing production methods, but shifted 
towards the generation of cutting-edge innovations and diversification of end-products. The 
next section discusses the development of state activities in relation to agriculture,121 
highlights the most important activities and policies, places Dutch agro policies in an 
international context and assesses the effects of Dutch agricultural policies.  
 
3.2.1 Crisis policy: depression and war (1930-1945) 
Into the late 1920s, the state was hardly willing to sustain, let alone step up, its support for 
agriculture.122 However, when the crisis erupted in the early 1930s, small farmers, who had 
been so successful since the 1890s partly thanks to state policies (see chapter 2), were badly 
affected. Export-oriented smallholdings turned out to be especially vulnerable in the event of 
an economic downturn and collapse of international trade, which meant that the prospects 
for a large portion of the Dutch workforce (and of the Dutch electorate) were gloomy.  
 
From 1927 to 1933 a state committee, led by F.E.H. Ebels, was active, investigating the state 
of Dutch agriculture. One of its key conclusions was that there was a serious mismatch 
between the production factors land and labour in agriculture. The fact that there were too 
many small farms would become known as the ‘smallholders’ issue’ (Kleine Boeren 
Vraagstuk). As a result of the economic problems, agriculture became a key political concern.  
 
At first, the belief dominated that with some adaptation and patience, the crisis would be 
overcome and no interference would be needed. However, as the situation in the early 1930s 
became increasingly alarming, a continuation or even intensification of existing efforts by the 
Directorate of Agriculture was no longer considered enough to maintain the agricultural 
sector at pre-crisis levels. The pressure on the state to introduce output-side policies and 
intervene in agricultural markets increased.  
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In 1930 some temporary measures were taken, such as cheap credit for potato farmers in the 
Veenkolonien peat district in the northeast of the country and support for sugar beet and 
wheat farmers. However, it was not long before the situation began to escalate further and 
temporary but extensive crisis laws were introduced for wheat, dairy and pigs. The measures 
taken included excise duties, export subsidies, guaranteed minimum prices and the 
obligatory processing of Dutch agricultural products (including a set percentage of Dutch 
wheat in bread, and of real Dutch butter in margarineproducts). A law was also introduced to 
alleviate the rent burden with which many farmers were struggling.  
 
In 1933 an overall crisis law was adopted and a centralized crisis organization was 
established. The Minister of Economic Affairs (who took over agricultural affairs from the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs) was given the power to designate crisis products, limit 
production, monopolize trade, force producers to become members of centralized 
organizations and impose indirect taxes. In the mid-1930s,the relationship between 
agriculture and the state had altered radically. At this point, the total costs of the agricultural 
crisis laws amounted to about 20 per cent of the total state budget (Knibbe 1993: 201).123 The 
state support contributed as much as some 40 per cent to the total value added in agriculture 
(Bieleman 2008: 314). The number of employees of the agricultural crisis organization had 
grown explosively, adding up to what contemporaries referred to as ‘an army of civil 
servants’. The first attempts were made to establish an independent Ministry of Agriculture 
(Minderhoud 1947: 198). The switch from limited input policies to full blown output-side 
state intervention in the early 1930s was remarkably rapid. According to the agricultural 
economist Michael Tracy, ‘the Netherlands thus became one of the first countries to have an 
extensively planned organisation of its agricultural markets’ (Tracy, 189: 126). 
 
Intervention in agricultural markets was uncharted territory for the government. Therefore, 
the state relied heavily on representatives from the agricultural sector, most notably 
Stephanus Louwes,124 who was closely involved in the establishment of the wheat and pig 
crisis laws.125 Louwes also became head of the centralized crisis organization. The idea was to 
establish an effective but temporary organization with close links to the sector, which was 
expected to smooth the implementation of crisis laws. The crisis laws led to increased 
organization of the agricultural sector. Subsectors such as pig farming and dairy farming 
began to cooperate more closely, opening the way for the establishment of industrial 
organizations (boards) after the Second World War. Political parties also became more 
involved in agriculture and appointed their own agricultural experts. The basis was laid for a 
‘Green Front’ of representatives of agricultural organizations, agricultural civil servants and 
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parliamentarians, who had a shared background and fought for a common cause: the 
maintenance of a strong, export-oriented agricultural sector. 
 
The long-cherished course of free trade without market intervention was not abolished 
without objections. Industrial interests pointed to the higher bread prices resulting from 
market intervention, and the importance of the principle of laissez-faire as a cornerstone of 
Dutch trade policy. Despite continued criticism of the crisis laws, agrarian interests were 
successful in arguing their case for intervention. The sector, represented most vocally by 
arable farmers from Groningen, pointed to the distress in the countryside and the intrinsic 
importance of agriculture to justify government intervention. According to Stephanus 
Louwes, doing nothing would result in a ‘survival of the fattest rather than the fittest’ (Krips-
Van der Laan 1985: 70).  
 
In response to criticisms concerning the unequal treatment of agriculture and industry, the 
fact that consumers were paying for the crisis measures through higher prices and the high 
government expenditure to pay for the agricultural crisis laws, Louwes also argued that 
agricultural policy was a ‘compromise between economically desirable outcomes and social 
considerations’ (Krips-Van der Laan 1985: 98).  
 
Influenced by the urgency of the situation, the arguments of the agricultural organizations, 
the size of the agricultural electorate and the fear of social unrest as a result of high 
unemployment, the state continued to support agriculture and to perceive the crisis measures 
as a temporary but necessary intervention to keep the many small family farms in business. 
The wish to maintain an export-oriented agricultural sector was strong enough to overrule 
the problems of higher consumer prices, a deterioration in the competitive position of Dutch 
industry, and considerable expense for the state. Neither the extensification of agriculture 
nor a reorientation towards the (protected) domestic market with a smaller and less 
competitive sector were considered as serious options. 
 
Although the introduction of output-side policies was most characteristic for the state 
activities in relation to agriculture in the 1930s, some developments took place on the input-
side as well. In 1936, a ‘Small Farmers’ Bureau’ (Dienst Kleine Bedrijven) was established to 
improve the situation for small farms, for example through extension efforts aimed at 
teaching farmers to run their businesses better. In 1937 a new Farm Lease Act (Pachtwet) 
was passed, strengthening the legal position of farmers vis-à-vis landowners (Douw and Post, 
2000: 88). To improve the agrarian structure, and also to provide work for unemployed farm 
labourers, projects were started to increase the area of agricultural land. A large number of 
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new institutes and foundations for a wide range of purposes was founded in the 1930s, 
leading in turn to the establishment of new supervising organizations like the Directorate for 
Agricultural Research (Directoraat voor Landbouwkundig Onderzoek) in 1939. The 
Directorate for Agriculture remained the key supervising organization for agricultural 
research, rather than the recently established organization for applied scientific research 
(TNO) that was supposed to represent all the different sectors of the Dutch economy.  
 
Meanwhile the agricultural college in Wageningen kept expanding and growing126 and 
relations between science and agricultural practice – between professors, experiment stations 
and extension officers – had become closer Maat 2002: 101). In this way a closely interwoven 
network grew up around Dutch agriculture, strengthening its special, sectorally organized 
position in the Dutch institutional landscape. 
 
In the late 1930s, the crisis organization that had grown out of the agricultural crisis was used 
to prepare for a situation of food shortages and limited export opportunities in the event of 
war. Stephanus Louwes became the head of the National Agency for the Preparation of 
Wartime Food Supply (Rijksbureau voor de Voorbereiding van de Voedselvoorziening in 
Oorlogstijd) in 1939), which later became the Food Supply Agency (Dienst der 
Voedselvoorziening) and which employed approximately 20,000 people Huizinga and 
Strijker 1983: 36). The organization was based largely on self-regulation, a lesson that had 
been learned during the First World War when animosity between farmers and the state 
developed as a result of the temporary market intervention that took place.127  
 
In order to produce enough food for the domestic market, the organization prescribed the 
conversion of arable into grassland, the cultivation of potato and cereals, and a reduction of 
the cattle stock. The Food Supply Agency managed to retain much of its independence from 
the Nazis during wartime occupation, and was rather successful in feeding the Dutch 
population until the final winter of the War (1944-45). 128 During the War, the institutional 
development of the agricultural sector continued. Six new research institutes were 
established, among them the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (Landbouw 
Economisch Instituut (LEI) in 1940, which was established to calculate prices, wages and 
production as a basis for regulation (Minderhoud 1952:248).  
 
3.2.2 Developmental policy: pushing for productivity growth (1945-mid-1980s) 
In the post-war decades, policies towards agriculture were intensified and the state became 
involved in almost all aspects of agriculture, on both the input and output sides. The state – 
more specifically the Ministry of Agriculture – continued to play an active and facilitating 
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role in the development of the agricultural sector until at least the mid-1980s when, as will be 
discussed in the next section, priorities shifted. In order to contextualize the initiation of the 
increased state activity in relation to the development of agriculture, several factors that 
shaped the states’ actions need to be considered.  
 
First of all, recovering from the damage resulting from the War required a collective and 
coordinated effort.129 Of central concern was the recovery of the food supply, which became a 
key task of the newly established Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Another 
priority was to restore the overall balance of payments through export of agricultural 
products so as to obtain the necessary foreign currency to buy capital goods. An important 
factor contributing to the recovery was the availability of capital and technology from the 
United States, as part of the Marshall aid plan.  
 
As the damaged production capacity was restored within a few years,130 the state policies 
could be redirected towards further economic development and growth. A reliable and 
continuous food supply at fair consumer prices, as well as fair compensation for farmers,131 
became the key priorities of this post-recovery state policy. The countryside was still regarded 
as being of intrinsic value and importance, but it was felt that farmers should integrate as 
much as possible into ‘modern’ society (Karel 2005; Karel 2007)  
 
Administrators at the Ministry and the various agricultural organizations were strongly 
persuaded by the idea that state and sector should cooperate closely to coordinate and speed 
up this modernization process. Few thoughts were devoted to alternative future pathways.132 
A key ‘modernization’ concern was that, as agricultural prices lagged behind relative to other 
consumer goods, the production per farmer needed to increase drastically if their incomes 
were not to fall behind in the long run.  
 
Moreover, wages would have to be suppressed at least temporarily, so that productivity gains 
did not dissipate but could be used for investment. In order to keep wages low, and also to 
cushion volatility, prices had to be regulated. As such, extensive state efforts on all these 
fronts were considered to be justified. The whole arsenal of agricultural policy instruments 
developed in the preceding decades was deployed and expanded further, while new 
instruments such as investment subsidies, wage policies and new market and pricing policies 
were introduced.  
 
To direct its activities, the state could build on the experience gained from experiments with 
coordination of the economy in the 1930s and 1940s. It could also build on the intensive 
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cooperation with the organized sector that had been established in this period. By way of 
illustration of this continuity and the importance of the agricultural network, the brothers 
Stephanus and Herman Louwes, both key figures in the 1930s response to the crisis and food 
supply during the War, took up central positions in the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Foundation for Agriculture, respectively. Sicco Mansholt, who was a descendant of a 
gentleman farmer family from Groningen and a distant relative of the Louwes brothers (and 
had been a reputed resistance fighter during the War) became the first post-war Minister of 
Agriculture.133 Mansholt held the post for 13 years (1945-1958) before moving to Brussels to 
become the first European Commissioner for Agriculture. Mansholt played a key role in 
shaping post-war agricultural policy, both in the Netherlands and in Europe.  
 
The relationship between agricultural organizations and the state was institutionalized 
through the Foundation for Agriculture and its successor, the Agricultural Board (see first 
section of this chapter). These organizations and the Minister met monthly, while civil 
servants from the Ministry and staff of the agricultural organizations cooperated intensively 
on many levels and in many areas. The state-sector cooperation in the post-war decades has 
often been referred to as a ‘Green Front’134 of interest organizations, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Parliamentary Committee on Agricultural Affairs, which consisted mostly 
of Christian-Democrat politicians. Characteristic for this Green Front was an atmosphere of 
consensus and a closely interwoven network, to which the cooperatives, knowledge 
institutions and agro-businesses also belonged. At the same time, it was an ‘elite’ network in 
which many small farmers who were pushed towards modernization did not feel represented. 
 
In the following paragraphs, the arsenal of policy instruments used by the state in the post-
war period will be discussed in more detail. Input policies (focused on affecting production 
capacity) will be discussed first, followed by output policies (aimed at affecting prices and 
markets). It is important to note that the role of European politics and policy became 
increasingly important in this period. Its influence on output policy was especially marked, 
while the national state retained much of its control over input policies.  
 
In the first post-war years, government input policies focused mostly on the facilitation of 
development of both small and large farmers. Tractors and other new machines were adopted 
on a large scale, new land was taken into use (most notably the reclaimed Flevopolders), 
existing land was improved and production for export was stimulated. In order to allow for 
the application of technical innovations, the structure of the agricultural sector (in terms of 
land use and capital availability) had to improve. The government contributed to this 
improvement through an ‘adjustment policy’, for which some new policy instruments were 
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introduced. An important was the installation of the Borgstellingsfonds, a fund that provided 
security for loans and therefore encouraged farmers to invest. The fund was established in 
1951, in cooperation with farmers’ organizations and credit cooperatives, and endowed with 
considerable capital.135 Also, the state made efforts to slow down the general rise in land 
prices by buying up agricultural land, to improve the legal rights of leaseholders and regulate 
the price of land for rent and purchase.136 An important role was played by the Land 
Consolidation Agency (Cultuurtechnische Dienst), a government service that focused on a 
range of issues including land improvement.  
 
In the 1950s it became increasingly clear that, in order to achieve higher labour productivity, 
additional efforts were necessary to improve the agricultural structure, and especially an 
improvement in the land:labour ratio. This issue of land use had been a relatively neglected 
aspect of agricultural development policy in preceding decades. At this time, however, the 
large number of small farmers, working on small and fragmented plots, was perceived as a 
key bottleneck to further productivity gains in the agricultural sector. This ‘smallholders’ 
problem’ was especially pressing in the sandy soil areas, where the agricultural workforce had 
grown quickly in the preceding century and a relatively small-scale and inefficient 
agricultural structure had developed.137 So far, the experience had been that without a 
forceful government role, this problem could not be solved. To improve land use, two main 
policy strategies were pursued.  
 
On the one hand, the extensive efforts to achieve land consolidation were important. Key to 
the rapid implementation of land consolidation was the Long-term Land Consolidation Plan 
(Meerjarenplan Ruilverkaveling), which was adopted in 1958). The Plan not only 
encouraged land consolidation (ruilverkaveling) but also broader land improvement efforts, 
including the improvement of dykes and roads, the construction of canals, the building of 
bridges and relocation and modernization of farms. The Plan was very effective in increasing 
the acreage of land consolidation projects implemented each year (see figure 3.6). However, 
little attention was paid to the effects of land policies on nature and landscape (see next 
section). The first memorandums on such issues only began to circulate in the mid-1970s. 
 
However, to increase labour productivity and achieve economies of scale, land consolidation 
by itself was not enough. It was also considered necessary to concentrate agricultural 
production in the hands of fewer but larger agricultural holdings. The need for this became 
increasingly clear not only because the availability of land was limited, but also because 
markets for products like milk began to saturate in the 1950s.138 In other words, both in 
terms of physical space and in the market for agricultural markets, there was not enough 
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room for all. This meant not only that some farmers had to scale up, but also that others had 
to give up farming. To achieve this dual aim of development and outflow, the Agricultural 
Development and Rationalisation Fund (Ontwikkelings- en Saneringsfonds, O&S Fonds) was 
established in 1963.  
 
The Fund was initially created in order to help older farmers sell their business on reasonable 
terms, but it became especially important as an instrument to help young farmers to set up a 
successful business.139 The O&S Fonds remained in place for a long time and made a 
significant contribution to the development of the agricultural sector. An important measure 
that was implemented within its framework was the interest subsidy scheme (rente-
subsidieregeling), which operated from 1972 to 1985 and which contributed significantly to 
the development of the dairy and horticultural sectors.140 Some special arrangements to 
encourage investment in a particular direction were made in specific sub-sectors. Glasshouse 
horticulturalists, for example, were able to benefit from low natural gas prices to foster a 
transition away from the more obviously polluting coal, but also to stimulate production in 
this successful growth sector. 
 
Figure 3.6 Acreage of land consolidation projects implemented annually from 
the 1920s to the 1980s. The rapid pace of land consolidation after 
the Second World War can be clearly seen, as can the effect of the 
1958 Long-term Land Consolidation Plan 
 
 
Source: CBS (with thanks to Jan Bieleman for compiling these figures).  
 
Whereas output policies (as discussed later in this section) became largely a matter of 
common European policy, input policies – including those affecting land use, development 
and outflow – remained largely in the hands of national governments.141 In 1968, EEC 
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Commissioner Sicco Mansholt had proposed a far-reaching structural policy at European 
level, focusing on the dual aim of development and outflow. The goal was to cap total 
production and prevent the escalation of a looming surplus problem through the 
extensification of large farms and setting aside land. By increasing the scale of agricultural 
holdings, the income and competitiveness of individual farms would also be improved. 
Mansholt envisioned a sector that would be capable of operating without output (market and 
price) policies within ten years.  
 
However, Mansholt’s plans met with fierce resistance from farmers all over Europe. As a 
consequence, efforts to implement a high-impact structural policy agenda at European level 
were largely abandoned. Nonetheless, some structural policies were enacted (the fewest 
among those focused on capping production, the most among those focused on productivity 
increases). These European policies were of some consequence to the Netherlands; the 
interest subsidy scheme, for example, was partly financed from the European budget 
(Meester, Oskam and Sivils (eds.) 2005: 21).  
 
To achieve modernization of agriculture, the tried and tested knowledge policy recipe of 
education, extension and research was also rapidly intensified and expanded in the post-war 
decades. The agricultural research infrastructure further developed its integrated and 
collective character, relatively separate and independent from the rest of the Dutch 
knowledge infrastructure. The Ministry of Agriculture played a key role in the design and 
execution of this agricultural knowledge policy. It founded directorates to manage education, 
research and extension, expanding and rationalizing its organizational structure over time.  
 
The three elements of the knowledge infrastructure were clearly intertwined. Research, at 
both the practical and the fundamental level, contributed to the development of useful 
knowledge; education prepared the next generation of farmers to work with this knowledge; 
and extension fostered the diffusion of knowledge among farmers, increased the scientists’ 
awareness of practical problems, and played an important role in narrowing the gap between 
the knowledge infrastructure, policymaking and agriculture. This state-instigated and state-
controlled agricultural innovation system began to function rather effectively as a tool for 
productivity growth, as the linking of theory and practice was now achieved through an 
integrated knowledge policy (Maat 2003: 260).  
 
Especially notable was the large extension apparatus that was put in place in a concerted 
effort by the Ministry, farmers’ organizations, cooperatives and commercial parties. 
Extension officers working for farmers’ organizations focused on socio-economic matters, 
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while the state officers focused on business administration and technical aspects. The staff of 
the state extension service tripled from approximately 500 to 1,500 in the first post-war years 
(see figure 2.4). The farmers’ organizations themselves employed almost 2,000 extension 
officers in 1956. The state extension service consisted of two levels and was organized in such 
a way as to connect policy, science and practice.  
 
The first layer targeted farmers directly, through decentralized extension in over 100 specific 
regions. Regional extension officers maintained close contact with specialists and engineers 
and were active in a wide range of local agriculture-related organizations. The extension 
service was thus able to maintain a close connection to local issues. The second layer focused 
on linking the extension efforts to relevant research, politics and administration. To 
encourage cooperation, a National Extension Council (Nationale Voorlichtingsraad) was 
founded in 1953 and capacity was increased at the Ministry of Agriculture. 142  
 
The number of agricultural schools also grew quickly in the post-war decades, and a dense 
and multilayered institutional framework developed, consisting of lower, middle and higher 
agricultural education with the Agricultural College in Wageningen topping the pyramid 
(Goudswaard, 1986). Something similar can be said about the research infrastructure. 
Agricultural research was effectively organized in three layers, with the Agricultural College 
in Wageningen focusing on fundamental research while the research institutes carried out 
strategic research and the experiment stations performed applied research.143  
 
To coordinate and structure agricultural knowledge production at a wide range of agricultural 
research institutes, the National Agricultural Research Council (Nationale Raad voor 
Landbouwkundig Onderzoek - NRLO) was established in 1957. The Council was placed within 
the sector-overarching Netherlands Organizations for Applied Scientific Research (TNO). The 
NRLO, however, developed a distinctively agricultural character, functioning mostly as a 
science policy instrument of the Ministry of Agriculture.144 The majority of the Council board 
was made up of administrators from the Ministry of Agriculture, Wageningen University and 
the agricultural organizations.  
 
Initially, NRLO was responsible for the research agenda of the three dozen research institutes 
that fell under the executive responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture. From 1970 
onwards, the NRLO was responsible for the coordination of an even wider spectrum of 
agricultural research agendas, including those of Wageningen University , the faculty of 
veterinary sciences at the University of Utrecht, the food division of TNO and more. Over 
time, the Council lost power to the Ministry of Agriculture, before being (temporarily) 
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incorporated into the Ministry in 1985, again highlighting the central role played by the 
Ministry.145  
 
While the state expanded its efforts on the input side of agriculture in the post-war decades, 
it arguably did so even more on the output side, through policies affecting the internal as well 
as international trade in agricultural products (market policies) and the prices at which 
agricultural goods were traded (pricing policies). The state also intensified its efforts to 
promote consumption and exports.146 Immediately after the Second World War, the Dutch 
market for agricultural products was highly regulated. Prices were controlled by the 
Agricultural Price Equalization Fund (Landbouw-Egalisatie Fonds – a LEF). The state 
guaranteed farmers a price that was 20 percent above the calculated production costs, as 
determined by the LEI using a number of ‘model farms’.  
 
To keep consumer prices low, the state bridged the gap with consumer subsidies if the prices 
guaranteed to farmers or imports were too high. As prices on the world market declined in 
the 1950s and the production capacity of Dutch agriculture grew, the situation changed 
completely, and the state switched from subsidizing consumers to subsidizing producers. The 
goal was to maintain acceptable price levels for agricultural producers (Van Zanden and 
Griffiths 1989: 76). However, as world agricultural prices, especially for dairy products, 
continued to decline while the production capacity of Dutch farmers kept on growing, state 
expenditure grew explosively. Some adjustments were made to the level of guaranteed prices, 
but it was clear that the policy could not be maintained in the long run.  
 
The solution for this problem was sought in the direction of a common European market, 
which would give Dutch farmers an outlet for their surplus production at regulated price 
levels. However, such a common market was not easy to achieve. A wide range of protective 
regimes operated in the different European countries, each of them fiercely guarded by 
entrenched vested interests. Several early attempts by Mansholt to achieve international 
market integration did not succeed.147  
 
Nevertheless, there was a willingness to integrate the agricultural markets as part of a wider 
agenda of European cooperation, as long as national agricultural interests were not 
negatively affected. In 1957, the leaders of the six European countries that ratified the Treaty 
of Rome148 agreed on the inclusion of an agricultural clause that called for the creation of a 
European agricultural policy. The next year, Mansholt moved from The Hague to Brussels 
and began to work on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Notoriously lengthy 
deliberations were necessary to achieve consensus among the six participants in the 
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negotiations. Especially problematic was the necessity to grant French arable farmers 
beneficial export conditions, while assuring German farmers of the continuation of the high 
prices that had developed on the highly protected German market.  
 
The final compromise guaranteed a common price level that was considerably higher than 
the world market price for a wide range of products. The CAP was based on three principles: 
market unity, Community preference and financial solidarity (Tracy 1989: 257). The first 
measures were enacted in 1962, and the Common Agricultural Policy became fully 
operational in 1968. The actual policy instruments were complicated and diverse, having to 
take into account a wide range of national legacies, six independent currencies and different 
regulations for numerous different products. Some products, including grains and dairy, 
were heavily regulated, while others, such as floricultural products, pig and poultry meat and 
eggs, were only slightly affected.  
 
Figure 3.7 Development of state expenditures on the CAP in the period 1958-
2008. The figure shows clearly the rapidly rising expenditures on 
the CAP in the first decade of enactment and up to the mid-1980s. 
Since then, the expenditure as a percentage of the total state 
expenditures of member states, as well as of GDI, has stagnated and 
decreased somewhat, but not in proportion to the declining 
importance of agriculture in terms of employment or its 
contribution to GDI (although the greater importance of 
agriculture in the new member states in Southern and Eastern 
Europe counterbalances this argument somewhat) 
 
 
Source: EU Commission  
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The CAP had an immediate and profound impact. By 1967 approximately half the agricultural 
income consisted of transfers. In 1968, the Common Agricultural Policy accounted for 90 
percent of the EC budget, equivalent to 1,1 percent of the total government expenditure of the 
combined member states and 0,4 percent of the Community’s combined GDI. Especially 
costly was the pricing policy for milk and subsidies to dairy farmers, which accounted for 85 
percent of the expenditures on the Common Agricultural Policy by 1970 (Meester et al.(eds.) 
2005: 68). Whereas the CAP was initially established to solve the problem of surpluses that 
had developed at national level, the actual policies had rather the opposite effect. Guaranteed 
prices stimulated production, while the problem of overproduction was insufficiently 
recognized and acknowledged. In those cases where it was acknowledged, farmers lobbied 
effectively against a rigorous structural policy to curb increases in aggregate production – as 
Mansholt experienced in 1968 (see above).  
 
3.2.3 Corrective policy: a renewed sector-state relationship (mid-1980s-present) 
In the first post-war decades, the fact that agricultural policies were conceived in an 
atmosphere of consensus within a tightly knit agricultural network (the Green Front) also 
depended on a broader consensus in society about the merits of agriculture. This consensus is 
articulated by the following statement from a 1970 report by the Wiardi Beckmanstichting, 
the think-tank of the Dutch labour party:  
 
“Apparently, the goals of agricultural policy have become so commonly accepted among the 
Dutch people that there are no longer fundamental disagreements between the most 
important political groups in society about them.”149 
 
Influenced by the heated debates about the limits of growth that developed in the 1970s, this 
consensus was broken, and the Green Front was confronted with new realities. Not only the 
focus on agricultural production to the detriment of landscape, animal welfare and ecology 
was criticized, but the relationship between state and sector also came under growing 
pressure.  
 
A first turning point was the Relatienota (1975), a cabinet proposal aimed at involving 
farmers in nature conservation. Farmers were fiercely critical of the proposal; they did not 
want to become ‘park rangers’.150 On a more general level, towards the end of the 1970s state 
expenditures were placed under increased scrutiny, and new ideas about a leaner state 
apparatus, most famously articulated by Reagan and Thatcher, reached the Netherlands. The 
close relationship between the state and the agricultural sector was increasingly seen as 
undesirable, and the generous expenditures on input and especially output policies were no 
longer taken as read. The Green Front began to fall apart under pressure from both the 
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outside and the inside. Individual farmers became more critical of the collective 
arrangements and payments and became more commercially-minded, while the role of large 
businesses vis-à-vis government on the one hand and farmers on the other steadily grew. In 
the mid-1980s, these new realities could no longer be ignored, and the relationship between 
the state and sector began to change. This change would turn out to be a difficult process with 
far-reaching consequences. 
 
The first institutional change that notably broke with preceding decades was the migration of 
civil servants concerned with environmental issues from the Ministry of Culture, Recreation 
and Social Work (Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk) to the 
Ministry of Agriculture in 1982, breaking the monopoly of agricultural interests at the 
Ministry. Seven years later, the presence of environmental interests had become so 
institutionalized that ‘nature’ had become one of the Ministry’s key domains and its name 
was changed into the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Conservation and Fisheries (Ministerie 
van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij).  
 
Another turning point was the secret introduction of manure legislation in 1984. Equally 
important was the introduction of European milk quotas in that same year, designed to curb 
the rise in milk production that had led to surpluses in the preceding decade and put 
increasing pressure on the EC budget. In 1989 the Van der Stee Committee (Commissie Van 
der Stee), which had the brief of examining the Dutch agricultural sector, concluded that 
there was too much focus on cheap production and too little sensitivity towards the market, 
thereby pointing up the limitations of the central philosophy driving Dutch agricultural 
policy. The key assumptions about production and productivity growth that had prevailed in 
the preceding decades were no longer automatically accepted in the second half of the 1980s.  
 
The hierarchical organizational structure and culture of the Ministry, focused mainly on the 
effective implementation of technical aspects, turned out not to be very suitable for the wide 
range of new tasks. The new measures to limit growth and negative external effects were 
perceived as unpredictable, unfeasible and unpopular in the various ranks of the agricultural 
sector. As the Ministry’s key task had been to increase productivity by incentivizing farmers, 
the new focus on curbing negative effects of agricultural production meant a radical break 
with the past. For example, it was feared that foreknowledge among pig farmers about the 
new manure legislation of 1984 would have led to an undesirable wave of investment. To 
prevent information leaking out, the regular network of agricultural policymakers was 
circumvented, leading to a serious crisis of trust.  
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It was not only farmers who were displeased with the new situation; civil servants also 
resisted change. A serious crisis of trust among farmers, civil servants in executive positions, 
policymakers and administrators ensued. Also vulnerable were the extension service and the 
Agricultural Board, both of which functioned as intermediates between policymakers and 
farmers and which now found themselves having to play with a difficult mediating role 
(Wielinga, 2001).  
 
The transformative process in agricultural policymaking continued into the 1990s. In its 
process of reorientation and reorganization, the Ministry of Agriculture went through a 
period of interpersonal problems, organizational crises and negative media attention (Bekke, 
De Vries and Neelen 1994). Minister Gerrit Braks was forced to resign following the discovery 
of fraudulent practices in the Fisheries department.  
 
A committee led by Neelie Kroes concluded in 1992 that there was a culture of not accepting 
criticism and too much top-down management at the Ministry (Commissie Kroes, 1992). At 
the same time, the Agricultural Board went through a deep crisis. On the one hand it lost 
some of its power vis-à-vis the Ministry, while on the other its legitimacy towards farmers 
also began to crumble. The outcomes of its deliberations with the Ministry were no longer 
accepted by the different agricultural organizations, which opened their own, independent 
negotiations with the Ministry and later joined forces in the federative LTO. Stripped of most 
of its responsibilities, the Agricultural Board was formally abolished in 2001. The Commodity 
Boards have continued to exist, but their role has shifted from interest representation to 
implementation of regulations, and their legitimacy has been continuously questioned since 
the 1990s.151  
 
An important move away from the traditional Green Front and the definitive shift towards a 
new period came when a new government took office in the form of the ‘purple coalition’ of 
the liberal, social =liberal and labour parties (1994-2002), the first coalition since 1918 to 
exclude the Christian Democratic party. Jozias van Aartsen, the first liberal Minister of 
Agriculture (1994-1998) and an outsider to the agricultural network, made clear that the 
Green Front was a thing of the past when he declared that, ‘no longer will policy be made in 
intimate cooperation with the agricultural organizations’.152  
 
When the crisis at the Ministry of Agriculture began to subside in the mid-1990s a new reality 
emerged. Agricultural interests had lost their central position within the Ministry, while 
environmental issues as well as broader agribusiness issues had become more important. The 
Ministry moved away from being sector-specific and representative of the agricultural sector 
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to being responsible for a section of the public interest. Following this period of 
‘normalization’ of relations between the Ministry and the sector, the Ministry experienced a 
period of relative stability in the late 1990s and in the 2000s. In 2010 the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Economic Affairs were merged to form one overarching 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (Ministerie van Economische 
Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie - EL&I).  
 
The loosening of the ties between agriculture and the state can also be seen at European level. 
Public and political support for the CAP has declined and broader agriculture-related issues, 
including countryside development, nature conservation, food security and disease 
prevention have become more important (Oskam, Silvis and Meester 2011). Despite this, the 
CAP continues to swallow up a considerable proportion of the European budget and 
manpower, and the subsidizing of farms remains an issue of controversy and debate.  
 
The whole gamut of state policies in relation to agriculture has been affected by the changes 
since the 1980s. In the next paragraph, developments in a number of input and output policy 
areas will be discussed in more detail. First of all, input policies, including investment 
subsidies and land policies that stimulated production were now radically revised to curb 
further production growth. For example, a ‘slaughter and switch regulation’ (slacht- en 
omschakelingsregeling, or SLOM-regeling) was introduced to curb dairy production. Another 
example was the new Land Use Act (Landinrichtingswet) which was introduced in 1985 and 
shifted power away from the agricultural sector towards provincial governments, which were 
considered the proper guardians of the public (rather than agricultural) interest (Douw and 
Post 2000: 85). EU output policies were similarly reformed to curb production.  
 
Moreover, the EU came under pressure to liberalize the agricultural market within the 
framework of international trade negotiations. In addition to the milk quotas, which affected 
the dairy sector, EU Commissioner for Agriculture Raymond MacSharry introduced reforms 
in 1992 that affected arable production. The measures included a shift from subsidies based 
on production to subsidies based on acreage, forced set-aside measures, and a reduction in 
guaranteed prices and export subsidies.  
 
The effect of the MacSharry reforms on Dutch farmers was limited, as the role of heavily 
supported arable products in Dutch agriculture was small anyway, but livestock farmers lost 
some of their previous competitive advantage that had resulted from their privileged access 
to cheap grain substitutes as a result of the ‘Rotterdam Loophole’ (Douw and Post, 2000: 67, 
also see above). The milk quotas and the MacSharry reforms were only the beginning of a 
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gradual process of reform of the CAP which continues today. This process of reform has meant 
a reduction in transfers to farmers and a shift from transfers based on production to direct 
income supplements, sometimes linked to specific criteria relating to nature management, 
countryside conservation or sustainability efforts (meaning that ‘output’ no longer meant 
food or other products from the land, but instead services such as nature or landscape 
conservation).  
 
However, although European agricultural policies have changed, the agricultural market is 
still far from being fully liberalized, and farmers throughout Europe still receive considerable 
support from the CAP. It is important to bear in mind that a majority of Dutch farmers are not 
affected directly by the changes in EU output policy, as they (especially ‘footloose’ poultry 
and pig farmers, horticulturalists and arable farmers producing consumption potatoes) were 
already operating in an open, competitive market and did not receive income support 
anyway. For them, new environmental regulations concerning manure production and 
pesticide use were of much greater consequence.  
 
The agricultural research infrastructure which had long been the crown jewel in Dutch 
agricultural policy also went through a process of transformation. The integrated knowledge 
policy of the OVO Drieluik (Education, Extension and Research Triangle) had been 
particularly effective in the post-war decades in improving efficiency, reducing costs and 
increasing productivity in agriculture. An early example of awareness that the knowledge 
policy needed to change in the face of changing circumstances is a passage from the 1971 
budget proposal of the Ministry of Agriculture, stating that: 
 
“increasingly, agricultural research needs to take account of other sectors within our society, 
and to ensure that the results of this research are also applicable, or can be made applicable, to 
more goals outside the direct sphere of agriculture.”153 
 
Despite the existence of such early warnings, it would take the turmoil of the mid-1980s 
before the knowledge infrastructure entered a period of fundamental reorganization. The 
timing of this change is explained by a combinations of factors, including the growing 
importance of new research areas, the fact that agriculture had become a smaller sector with 
more individualistic, assertive farmers,154 the increasing importance of private R&D efforts 
and the emergence of a new state philosophy of corporatization and privatization.  
 
The fact that the knowledge infrastructure had grown in a relatively organic way, resulting in 
a plethora of committees, directorates and institutes with overlapping agendas, contributed 
to the perceived need for change. From the early 1980s onwards, the Ministry began to draw 
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a sharper distinction between policymaking at the Ministry and implementation through 
corporatized and later privatized organizations. The Ministry reorganized its directorates 
several times, simplifying its organizational structure and centralizing coordination of and 
responsibility for research, extension and education. The NRLO was incorporated into the 
Ministry and stripped of most of its activities155. A similar process of centralization and 
coordination took place in the extension infrastructure. The numerous decentralized 
extension organizations were reorganized into two (later three) centralized Information and 
Knowledge Centres (Informatie en Kennis Centra – IKC). Regional extension units were 
scaled up to provincial level (later four regions) under the direct supervision of the Ministry.  
 
While the Ministry stepped up its efforts to coordinate the knowledge infrastructure, it also 
let go of the implementing organizations that were involved in the actual execution of 
research and extension. The numerous semi-public research institutes, including ten 
experiment stations and approximately 50 experimental farms and gardens, were placed 
under the control of the Agricultural Research Service (Dienst Landbouwkundig Onderzoek 
– DLO), which was established in 1989. In subsequent years, the DLO organizations went 
through a process of reorganizations and mergers, in which the number of institutes 
decreased. The actual extension to farmers was reorganized into a new body, the Agricultural 
Extension Service (Dienst Landbouw Voorlichting – DLV), which was corporatized in 1989.  
 
Agricultural education and the Agricultural College in Wageningen, which had already 
developed a relatively independent position vis-à-vis the Ministry, also went through a 
process of reorganization. The number of agricultural schools decreased as the number of 
students declined. The Agricultural College moved towards a more integrated research 
agenda and became increasingly dependent on research funding from outside the Ministry.156 
In 1986 it was officially given the status of a university. While the total number of students 
declined throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the number of research positions and 
international students began to increase (Roseboom and Rutten 2001: 228).  
 
The changes in the 1980s and early 1990s were far-reaching enough for the Ministry to 
deliberately abandon the term OVO Drieluik and replace it with the term ‘agricultural 
knowledge infrastructure’ (Wielinga 2001: 77). However, although the break with the past 
was radical, a new equilibrium had not yet been found.  
 
In 1996 Bram Peper was asked to advise the Minister of Agriculture about the future of the 
knowledge infrastructure. He presented his findings to the report Duurzame kennis, 
duurzame landbouw (‘Sustainable knowledge, sustainable agriculture’) in which he 
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concluded that the knowledge system was characterized by unnecessary competition and 
overlap. He also concluded that research facilities should be merged under the banner of 
Wageningen University and Research Centre (WUR), which should broaden its research 
agenda and strive for an international reputation for excellence (Peper 1996).  
 
In 1998, the WUR was officially established through the merger of the privatized DLO 
institutes and the Agricultural University. The DLV was privatized in 1998, while the practical 
research at experimental gardens and farms was removed from direct government funding 
and placed under the control of regional agricultural organizations (Roseboom and Rutten 
2001: 223). In 2000, the NRLO was incorporated into the Innovation Network 
(Innovatienetwerk). In 2004 the merged Van Hall and Larenstein colleges (hogescholen) 
became part of WUR. With the founding of WUR, most agricultural research activities, both 
practical and fundamental, were concentrated in one overarching organization. This 
structure is unique in the Netherlands, as other practical research organizations are funded 
through TNO. Moreover, WUR retained its funding from the Ministry of Agriculture (and is 
currently still funded by the Ministry of EL&I), rather than the Ministry of Education like all 
other Dutch universities. This means that a choice has been made to retain some of the 
specific characteristics of the agricultural knowledge framework.  
 
The link between theory and practice, and thus between science and business, which had 
always been an important characteristic of agricultural knowledge in the Netherlands, has 
been retained and further intensified in the last two decades. Whereas the costs of research 
had formerly been met mainly by the Ministry, the agricultural organizations, the 
Agricultural Board and the Commodity Boards, in recent decades new constructions have 
developed. Whereas research and extension expenditures were formerly characterized by 
fixed institutional structures and collective payments, they are now increasingly 
characterized by temporary project-based collaborations and ‘user pays’ arrangements. Also, 
market incentives and competition on the basis of output criteria or tender constructions 
have become the norm.  
 
Moreover, instead of carrying out research projects itself, the state has encouraged private 
parties (small, medium-sized and large enterprises) to step up their research efforts, for 
example by offering tax breaks.157 Finally, different forms of cooperation between public and 
private parties have become more important. Examples include a wide range of consortia 
assembled to investigate specific issues, the two agro-related ‘Technological Top Institutes’ 
(Technologische Topinstituten – TTIs) Green Genetics (Groene Genetica) and Food and 
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Nutrition, in which research activities are coordinated, and cooperation on a project basis 
aimed at the valorization of knowledge is facilitated.  
 
The most recent example of public-private cooperation and research coordination is the 
establishment of two agro-related ‘Top Sectors’ (Topsectoren), Horticulture and Propagation 
Materials (Tuinbouw en Uitgangsmaterialen) and Agri&Food (Idem.) Together with 7 other 
economic clusters, these sectors have been chosen on a competitive basis by the Ministry of 
EL&I as key areas of innovation and cooperation between science and business. Although the 
new forms of cooperation in practical research described above differ significantly from the 
classical OVO Drieluik, they are often framed as typical for the agro sector. To point up the 
close and productive relations between the state, private business and research institutes in 
the agro sector, the term ‘Golden Triangle’ (Gouden Driehoek) has been coined, which now 
serves as a model for Dutch industrial policy (Verhagen 2011: 3-4). 
 
3.3 Assessing the role of the state 
3.3.1 Causes of state intervention 
The foregoing sections provide an overview of agricultural development and state policies in 
the period after 1930. The following paragraphs will focus on putting the state policies into 
perspective and assessing their consequences. The reactions of the Dutch state to the crisis in 
the 1930s signified a clear break from the policy of refraining from market interventions 
which characterized the preceding period. From the early 1930s onwards, the Dutch 
government, hesitantly at first,158 gradually began to aid farmers financially, to regulate the 
import and export of specific agro-commodities such as sugar, wheat and dairy products, and 
even to intervene in the domestic market for agro-products such as bread and butter. These 
actions by the Dutch state, although radical in a Dutch historical perspective, are part of a 
wave of protectionist measures that spread across the developed world.  
 
As these measures threatened the export-oriented character of Dutch agriculture, it comes as 
no surprise that the Dutch state responded. In fact, compared to the policies in surrounding 
nations, the Dutch output policies were actually mild. To give one example, the Dutch laws 
forcing bakers to incorporate a set amount of Dutch wheat into their bread flour mix (‘milling 
ratio’) was relatively modest compared to similar laws in other European countries.159  
 
The state interventions across the developed world in the early 1930s had a profound impact 
on the relationship between agriculture and the state. Once in place, protectionism was not 
removed, even when the Depression waned somewhat in the second half of the 1930s. At that 
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point, the impending war was looming as the next challenge, again requiring a strong and 
directive government role. Government interventions in the agricultural markets remained 
intact after the Second World War, not just during the years of reconstruction, but also in the 
subsequent post-war decades. Again, the persistence of state intervention in agricultural 
markets was not a typically Dutch phenomenon, but could be observed in all developed 
countries in the world, especially so in Japan and Europe. Federico (2005: 196) argues that 
the 1930s crisis signified a ‘quantum leap forward in state intervention’ and argues that:  
 
“… (a )t the end of the war, in theory, “developed” countries could have decided to phase out 
the support to agriculture, as a temporary response to the exceptional circumstances of the 
1930s and 1940s, and to return to the pre-1929 low intervention, if not to nineteenth-century 
laissez faire. This did not happen. The United States did discuss a reform of their agricultural 
policy, but no one questioned the principle that farmers deserved special support. At the end 
of the day, all “advanced” countries opted for strengthening the emergency support to 
agriculture and making it permanent.” 
 
On this wider international playing field, the Netherlands transferred its output policies to 
the supranational European Community. The national interests were weighted, compromises 
made, and a Common Agricultural Policy was established in the 1960s and 1970s. The basics 
of these policies are still largely in place today.  
 
Besides the intervention in markets and prices, the commitment of governments to increase 
farmers’ incomes and stimulate productivity growth through structural and knowledge 
policies can be widely observed, as can the intensive cooperation with the agricultural sector 
through a wide range of semi-public and corporatist governance organizations.160 The 
shifting relationship between governments and agriculture since the 1980s, entailing a 
concern for the ecological, social and financial consequences of policy, a more corrective 
government attitude, more focus on competition and a larger and more powerful role for 
private enterprise, is also not a typically Dutch phenomenon but can be observed across the 
developed world.  
 
The key question is why governments have been so actively involved with agriculture, on both 
the input and output sides, and why state policies were in place more or less continuously 
from the 1930s to the mid-1980s, after which they were largely abandoned and transformed 
and a ‘normalization’ of the relationship between state and sector took place. A first 
explanatory factor is the more general historical role of the state in economic affairs. Anton 
Schuurman (forthcoming), using a typology introduced by Lash and Urry (1993), frames 
Dutch agricultural policy in terms of the development of ‘organized capitalism’ from the 19th 
century to the 1980s, subsequently followed by a period of ‘disorganized capitalism’.  
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The shift from a close sector-state relationship to a more distanced government role also fits 
in with the theoretical framework of Barry Eichengreen (2004). Eichengreen argues that 
post-war Europe is characterized by ‘coordinated capitalism’, with a central role for the state. 
Coordinated capitalism was effective in this period, because the European economy was 
converging with the technically and organizationally more advanced American economy. To 
move closer to the American ‘technology frontier’, Europe relied on implementing imported 
technology. A strong government was particularly well suited to achieve this goal as it could 
regulate and coordinate the economy to create a proper institutional climate for rapid 
productivity growth through convergence. However, once Europe moved closer to the 
frontier in the 1970s and 1980s, more private, bottom-up initiative was required to maintain 
growth, and the government-led model no longer functioned adequately. 
 
Although these models serve rather well to explain the development of agricultural policies 
over time, they do not explain why states have become so actively involved in agriculture 
compared to other sectors of the economy.161 To explain this ‘agricultural exceptionalism’, 
one can point first of all to the importance of agriculture to the wider economy. Generally, 
increasing agricultural productivity means that surplus labour becomes available for 
industrial sectors. This development was particularly desirable in the booming post-war 
decades, characterized by tight labour markets.  
 
For the Dutch state, agriculture was of extra importance, as the Netherlands had developed 
into an agro-specialist and had become a key agricultural exporter (see chapter 2). In recent 
decades, however, this argument for agricultural policy has largely lost its appeal, as the 
agricultural sector has itself become a highly productive ‘ agribusiness’ and labour for 
industry is no longer required.  
 
Other factors also played an important role in the development of agricultural policies. One 
important factor historically has been the goal of achieving (partial) self-sufficiency in food 
production and thereby increasing the level of food security for the population. This 
argument was especially valid after episodes of hunger and shortages, such as the Great 
Famine of the 1840s and the First and Second World Wars, and played an important role in 
state motivations to establish an agricultural policy. In recent decades, food security has 
become a less convincing argument to justify (expenditure on) agricultural policies, as new 
generations of citizens in the developed world no longer have memories of hunger and food 
shortages, but it continues to play a role in policymaking.  
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Another important factor in the development of agricultural policies has been the desire to 
increase the income level of farmers to bring them up to parity with income levels in industry. 
The experience of the Great Agricultural Crisis of the late 19th century and the crisis of the 
1930s had left the impression that agricultural incomes would fall behind, leading to rural 
poverty, a large gap between city and countryside and a breeding ground for political 
radicalism. In recent decades, this argument has lost much of its validity as farmers have 
scaled up and emancipated to become modern entrepreneurs.  
 
The active role of the state can also been justified by pointing out the specific characteristics 
of the agricultural sector. First, the agricultural sector traditionally consisted of a large 
number of small businesses. Because of its fragmented nature, the sector has developed a 
need to organize an overarching knowledge infrastructure and join forces to increase market 
power. Direct state involvement and corporatist arrangements were two ways of achieving 
these goals, in addition to cooperatives and agricultural organizations. These arguments have 
become less valid as cooperatives have scaled up, large agribusiness complexes have 
developed with considerable research capacity, and farmers themselves have increasingly 
preferred ‘user pays’ arrangements over collective research.  
 
Other specific characteristics of agriculture that have prompted state activity include 
dependence on unpredictable ecological conditions, the importance of agriculture for 
landscape, nature and biodiversity, the fact that agricultural production factors are relatively 
immovable, the volatility of agricultural prices and, as stated earlier, the importance of 
agriculture for the food supply.162 These arguments have recently been increasingly 
undermined by the development of footloose farms, no longer dependent on natural 
conditions, of no value to the landscape and producing for export rather than the domestic 
food supply.  
 
Another important factor that contributed to the willingness of the state to get involved in 
agriculture was the well-organized character of the sector. Agricultural lobbies were 
particularly effective in framing and expressing the interests of the sector and putting them 
on the political agenda. Agricultural policy was conceived within a ‘Green Front’, consisting 
mostly of agricultural insiders, and implemented through an ‘Iron Triangle’ of agricultural 
organizations, the Ministry of Agriculture and the agriculturally-minded politicians in 
parliament. The crumbling of the Green Front in the 1980s and the fragmentation of the 
agricultural sector have diminished the capacity to speak with one voice to defend 
agricultural interests.  
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3.3.2 Effects of state intervention 
This section attempts to draw some conclusions on the effects of state intervention by linking 
challenges to and developments in the Dutch agricultural sector to the various state policies. 
Whereas assessments of agricultural policies from the 1930s onwards are often focused on 
protectionism and the distortion of market forces that resulted from it, the Dutch case reveals 
a different picture.  
 
One key issue that stands out is the fact that the Netherlands retained its highly productive 
and competitive agricultural sector focused on production for export throughout the whole 
period, despite difficult competitive challenges and limited opportunities for growth. 
Productivity in dairy farming increased considerably, and the development of highly 
productive, technology-intensive footloose pig farming, poultry farming and horticulture 
stand out. In this process, Dutch agriculture managed to achieve higher levels of productivity 
than its foremost competitors Denmark, Great Britain and Belgium (see figure 2.5). Although 
productivity growth has slowed in recent decades, Dutch agriculture is still at the forefront in 
terms of export share, productivity and innovation. Of course, the role of state policies should 
not be overstated as an explanation for this success story.  
 
The fact that Dutch agriculture has developed a highly innovative character, builds on a long 
tradition and benefits from the position of the Netherlands as an open and geographically 
well-situated export economy are all part of the explanation. Nevertheless, state policies have 
played an important and largely conducive role in the development of the agricultural sector 
since the 1930s.  
 
Dutch output policies have generally been less protectionist and trade-aversive than in 
countries such as Germany or Italy. Rather, output policies in the Netherlands have generally 
been used to increase export opportunities. Moreover, compared to surrounding countries, 
market interventions have generally been relatively modest. Rather than fully shielding 
farmers from competitive pressure, the Dutch state applied market and pricing policies on 
only a modest scale in the 1930s and 1950s, and tried to retain some competitive elements.  
 
The focus on export opportunities and productivity growth continued even when output 
policies were arranged at European level through the CAP. Right from the earliest discussions, 
the CAP was highly politicized and criticized. The participating countries fought hard to have 
their interests represented as well as possible. Deals were struck, compromises made, the 
broader goals of European integration were brought to the negotiating table. The terms of the 
CAP were generally quite favourable for the Dutch agricultural sector. The dairy sector 
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received price support and export subsidies, boosting export opportunities at good prices for 
Dutch farmers. It should be noted that, though beneficial to Dutch farmers in the short term, 
these dairy policies turned out to be a disaster in the longer run as they provoked a serious 
surplus problem.163  
 
It should be emphasized that, apart from dairy products, the most important products of 
Dutch agriculture (pig, poultry, vegetables, consumer potatoes and floricultural products) 
were not supported with CAP market and pricing policies, but continued to operate in a 
competitive market environment. Despite this, the way in which the CAP was arranged was 
generally favourable for these products, too. Dutch farmers benefited from the agreements on 
preferential trade between the CAP countries, to the detriment of their Danish competitors 
who were not included in the common market.  
 
Moreover, as Dutch agriculture was characterized by higher productivity levels than in the 
surrounding countries, it was beneficial for the Netherlands that input policies were not 
transferred to the European level. This enabled the Dutch state to continue to implement its 
own input policies rather than having to transfer payments for structural policy to less 
productive Italian, French or German farmers, thereby indirectly supporting competitors. 
Moreover, the Netherlands reinvested monetary compensations received from Brussels, 
rather than paying them direct to farmers.  
 
Agricultural input policies by the Dutch state stand out for their strong focus on productivity 
growth and competitiveness in international markets. The state played a proactive role in 
establishing a highly effective knowledge infrastructure which was exceptionally well able to 
link theory and practice and contribute to productivity growth in the post-war period. It also 
contributed to a rapid outflow of labour from the sector and a transformation of land use 
through land consolidation projects. These measures were all conceived and executed in close 
cooperation with the agricultural sector. Effective institutional structures like the Agricultural 
Board and the Commodity Boards were established, as well as a wide range of semi-public 
institutes, and the state and sector cooperated in an atmosphere of consensus.  
 
The fact that the Netherlands managed to achieve income parity in agriculture by 1960, 
which was exceptional in a European context and was matched only by Belgium and 
Britain,164 and the fact that Dutch agriculture is still among the most productive in the world, 
should be at least partially attributed to these input policies. Input policies also contributed 
to the ability of Dutch agriculture to retain its position as an internationally competitive 
agricultural exporter to this day.  
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As well as these strengths, Dutch agricultural policies also had some weaknesses. First, the 
focus on productivity growth had some serious negative side-effects. For example, land 
consolidation fundamentally altered the face of the countryside and damaged vulnerable 
ecosystems. The scaling up of agricultural production to raise labour productivity forced large 
numbers of farmers out of their occupation (as well as their homes and lifestyle) and 
increased the use of scarce resources like fossil fuels (natural gas) in agricultural production.  
 
These negative effects were barely acknowledged in the post-war decades and were only 
seriously criticized in hindsight. The first signs that agriculture was moving in an 
unsustainable direction (ecological impact, surpluses) were ignored. One could therefore 
argue that, by focusing too heavily on one domain (productivity growth) without being able to 
oversee the consequences of its actions on other domains, the state was taking a large risk.  
 
Sustainability problems might also have occurred if the state had played such a central role, 
but the fact that it did probably aggravated unintended negative consequences of production, 
made the agricultural sector less sensitive to societal sentiment and made it more difficult to 
change course, as illustrated by the agricultural policy crisis in the 1980s and 1990s. At the 
very least, it prevented the state from correcting the sector at an early stage, thereby 
inhibiting a smooth transition.  
 
The close cooperation between state and sector is often invoked to explain the lack of 
adaptive power of agricultural policies.165 Although this cooperation contributed to achieving 
the goal of productivity growth, it also complicated the move towards a new agricultural 
policy in response to new realities in the 1980s and 1990s. This inability to reform in the face 
of changing circumstances was problematic for both the sector and the state. The sector had 
to reinvent itself in order to switch from a supply-led to a more demand-focused business 
model, and to develop its innovative capacity.  
 
However, state interventions had made the sector complacent and dependent. The state was 
confronted with a dilemma of supportive sectoral policy on the one hand, and corrective 
policy to benefit broader public interests like ecological sustainability, animal welfare, 
consumer health and healthy state finances on the other. Its close relationship with the sector 
meant that agricultural interests prevailed for a long time and the state failed to fully 
represent the public interest. Despite the validity of these arguments, and the considerable 
scholarly and public attention they have received, a new, more balanced relationship between 
state and sector seems to have developed in the last decade.  
 
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The foregoing two chapters discuss developments in the agro sector, describe state policies 
towards it and attempt to interpret the state policies in terms of causes and effects. A brief 
summary of the arguments was already presented in the introduction (see 1.3. ‘Brief outline 
of the arguments’). The paper concludes with a synthesis of the overall arguments.  
 
As already stated in the Introduction and throughout the foregoing chapters, the nature and 
composition of the agro sector has changed substantially over time. For example, the number 
of primary producers has declined considerably, farms have become knowledge and capital-
intensive enterprises, and other links in the agro chain, often large multinational 
corporations, have gained in strength. Secondly, the state has shifted its policy priorities and 
instruments to match the imperatives and interests of the day. For example, the challenges 
within the agro sector have changed, as has the relationship between the agro sector and 
society at large. These shifts over time raise a number of questions: 
 
How has the agro sector been defined historically in policy terms? On which interests 
and actors within the agro sector have policies focused? How does the sector policy 
relate to the government’s broader public role? 
 
Until the latter decades of the 20th century, policies towards the agro sector were almost 
synonymous with policies towards agriculture. Some specific challenges, characteristics of 
agriculture and the way the sector has been organized help to explain the special treatment 
agriculture has received from the state. The fact that the agricultural sector consisted of a 
large number of independent smallholders, and as a result also a large number of potential 
voters (as well as possibly unemployed and potentially radicalizing citizens) and a formidable 
organized lobby (especially in the post-war decades, even though the number of farmers 
began to decline) probably also played a crucial role in this special treatment.  
 
For example, farmers were clearly favoured by late 19th-century state policies that promoted 
cooperatives and farmers’ organizations and increased the market power of primary 
producers relative to other players in the agro chain. The 1930s law forcing bakers to use 
Dutch flour and margarine producers to mix in Dutch butter signifies a similar commitment 
to the agricultural sector. Dutch, and later European, market and pricing policies in the post-
war period had a similar effect of protecting primary producers (especially arable and dairy 
farmers), even though a large number of farmers were forced to leave the sector.  
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It is important to note, however, that even though the agricultural sector was organized and 
approached collectively, there have always been considerable internal differences. Arable 
farmers and livestock farmers have often had conflicting interests (cheap grain is bad for the 
profitability of arable farmers but good for livestock farmers who use the grain as feed); 
horticulturalists have often not felt fully represented by agricultural organizations; and large 
farmers and smallholders were affected in very different ways by developments. 
 
In the post-war decades, what was considered good from a sector perspective was not 
necessarily good from the perspective of individual farmers, many of whom had to terminate 
their business and sell their land to a bigger, more productive neighbour. State policies (often 
conceived in close cooperation with agricultural organizations) have generally favoured the 
most competitive sections of the agricultural sector and taken them as a standard to be 
emulated. Some have argued that this has been an overly narrow, one-dimensional view of 
sector development, which has caused problems in the long run (Van der Ploeg 2003).  
 
The idea that the state should not serve a narrow sectoral interest at the expense of its 
broader public role was already recognized in the 19th century. During the 1930s, in 
particular, this discussion flared up as the state spent considerable sums on agriculture and 
bread prices rose due to price interventions to support arable farmers. Afterwards, and partly 
due to the food shortages in the Second World War, the discussion receded, and in the post-
war decades it was generally felt that what was good for agriculture was also good for the 
country as a whole. From the 1970s onwards, the legitimacy of a focus on agriculture within 
the agro sector was increasingly undermined by the fact that farms scaled up, government 
took a more distant role in economic life and new public interests criticized the ‘agriculture-
minded’ attitude of the state.  
 
Since then, policies have become more focused on agro chains as a whole, now also including 
producers of inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.), processing industries, the retail sector 
and knowledge institutes. The new ‘top sector’ policy, as well as the merger of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture, are illustrative of this integrated, agro 
chain approach. At the same, the state’s sector policies have increasingly clashed with its 
larger public role. State policies have become more oriented towards ecological sustainability, 
animal health and welfare and consumer safety. In general, the policy focus has shifted from 
producers to consumers of agro products. Nevertheless, agriculture still has a special place in 
the European Common Agricultural Policy. The state has also maintained its focus on the 
most competitive sections of the agricultural sector, though it has also introduced policies to 
limit further growth and ecological pressure in pig farming and horticulture.  
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The Introduction has already given a brief summary of the historical argument. This 
conclusion will not repeat that exercise, but instead attempts to produce a synthesis to 
answer the main question addressed in this paper, perhaps enabling us to draw some lessons 
from historical experience.  
 
To what extent have Dutch state policies (1795-present) been successful in enabling 
the agro sector to cope with emerging challenges? 
 
First of all, it can be stated that the Dutch agro sector has been able to cope with challenges, 
as Dutch agriculture has remained highly productive and internationally competitive up to 
today (Jacobs et al. 1990; Snijders et al. 2007). Considering that the Dutch agro sector was 
already renowned in the 18th century, there seems to be a remarkable continuity, which can 
be attributed to factors other than state policy.  
 
At the same time, however, the long-term success story of Dutch agriculture was not a 
foregone conclusion, as the agro sector has been confronted with a continuous array of 
challenges, such as the agricultural crisis of the late 19th century, two high-impact wars (three 
if one includes the Napoleonic wars), the depression of the 1930s, stagnant agricultural prices 
and repeatedly saturating markets from the 1930s onwards, and ecological limitations and 
legitimacy problems from the 1980s onwards. Each of these challenges could have seriously 
harmed the sector. It would be a gross overstatement to conclude that the state is wholly 
responsible for guiding the agro sector through these challenges, but it certainly seems to be 
the case that the state repeatedly played a constructive role. It has generally cooperated 
closely with the sector, has been sensitive to the possibilities and imperatives of the day and 
has acted expeditiously to respond to emerging challenges. The state contributed to building 
a strong knowledge network, stimulated close cooperation between different players in the 
sector and fostered a climate of technological development and innovation.  
 
As agriculture had traditionally consisted of a large number of smallholders, economists have 
noted that a key market failure of the sector has been “a low level of private investments in 
appropriable research and development” (Federico, 2012: 28). The Dutch state has 
successfully mitigated this market failure in a long-term perspective. 
 
On the other hand, state interventions have not been without their downsides. Two criticisms 
are often heard in relation to agro policy. First, the close state-sector relationship is criticized 
as leading to policy rigidity; and secondly, the relationship is criticized for causing an overly 
narrow interest representation at the expense of the common good.  
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These criticisms are at least partly justified. In the late 19th century, state policies improved 
the position of small farmers but as a result also removed the incentive to scale up, leading to 
what in the 1930s became known as the ‘smallholders’ problem’. The agricultural problems of 
the 1930s and fact that in the post-war decades a particularly rapid and painful dual process 
of labour outflow and scaling-up of the remaining holdings was necessary (to maintain 
profitability and competitiveness), can therefore be framed as outcomes of the successful 
state interventions in the late 19th century.166 One could thus argue that the state did not react 
to the ‘ imperative of the day’, as has been argued so far, but in effect acted to correct its own 
damage done in an earlier period.  
 
A similar argument can be made for what happened next. The labour outflow and upscaling 
of the post-war decades was again supported by state policies. From the 1970s onwards these 
policies were severely criticized for being too drastic and producing a range of negative 
externalities (for landscape, nature, rural development, etc.), requiring a subsequent wave of 
state interventions to artificially correct what had gone wrong. Again, these interventions 
were painful, and the state was confronted with unwillingness within the sector (as well as 
within its own Ministry of Agriculture) to adopt more ecologically sustainable and consumer-
oriented approaches. A second market failure in agriculture, namely the ‘damage to the 
environment from modern technologies’ has clearly been less successfully tacked through 
state policies (Federico, 2012: 28).  
 
The overall pattern that emerges from the argumentation above is one of excessive 
oscillation, caused by a narrow focus of state policies and a lack of sensitivity to a wide range 
of circumstances in market and society. Such a conclusion would however be too simplistic 
for a number of reasons. First, the state often had little choice but to act in order to prevent 
serious damage to (or perhaps even a full-scale collapse of) the sector and related problems of 
unemployment and disorder. This was especially the case during the crucial episodes of the 
Great Agricultural Crisis (1876-1895) and the Great Depression (1929-1933).  
 
Moreover, the state did not act in isolation, but was often confronted by similarly active state 
policies in neighbouring countries. Moreover, the idea that state policies completely shielded 
agriculture from market incentives is mistaken. The Dutch state always allowed market 
incentives to reach agro producers at least partially, even after it introduced market and 
pricing policies in the 1930s. It did so at a time when other countries often chose to protect 
their agricultural sector more extensively.  
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Finally, one should generally not overstate the impact of state policies, as the state was only 
one actor (or rather a composite actor, itself encompassing a range of organizations and 
interests) in a broad spectrum of actors, including large corporations, knowledge institutions, 
cooperatives, unions, foundations, societies and individual farmers. It was also just one force 
in a historical arena of technological change, market integration, social and political 
disruptions and environmental change.  
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Notes 
                                                        
1  The agro sector is loosely defined as the complex of businesses that are involved in agriculture (consisting of 
the sub-sectors arable farming, livestock farming, horticulture), as well as those businesses that are involved 
in the chain of supply to agriculture and processing of agricultural products. This paper is mostly focused on 
agriculture itself, while the other links in the agro chain are discussed more peripherally. Although closely 
related, and in many ways similar, to the agro sector, the fishery sector is left out of the analysis.  
2  Working titles of the project: ‘Waar verdienen wij over 20 jaar ons brood mee?’ (‘How will the Dutch earn 
their bread 20 years from now?’). The author of the paper also engaged with the authors of the project 
‘Voedsel’ (Food). See www.wrr.nl/projecten for more information on both projects. 
3 .  The term ‘challenges’ is meant to include economic challenges, affecting supply, demand and prices that 
impact on the competitiveness, employment and profitability of the sector. It is also intended to include 
societal challenges such as environmental awareness and food safety concerns that affect the agro sector’s 
social legitimacy (its ‘licence to produce’). 
4  A wide range of alternative agricultural policy typologies have been suggested by other authors, each with 
their own merits and weaknesses (See for example Louwes (1980: 240), Van Bruchem (2005: 6) and Federico 
(2004: 187)). The typology of Chang stands out for its clarity and applicability in different historical periods. 
5  The term ‘structural policies’ is often used in this context, but because it has a strong connotation with land 
consolidation in the post-Second World War period, the term is avoided here to avoid confusion. 
6  The term ‘market and price policies’ is often used in this context, but because that term excludes marketing 
and product quality enhancement, Chang’s broader ‘output policies’ is preferred in this paper.  
7  For example, policies to encourage farmers to improve the quality of butter and cheese in the late 19th century 
included input policies (extension and training efforts to improve hygiene) as well as output policies (quality 
control marks, inspection services, export propaganda). 
8  Chang himself has introduced the typology, based on the historical experience in developed countries, to 
increase the ‘policy imagination’ of policymakers who are involved in agricultural policies in the developing 
world (Chang 2009: 35). 
9  Think of: different ministries, a parliament, state-mandated organizations, etc. 
10  For example, one could zoom in to the level of sub-sectors: horticulturalists, livestock farmers, arable farmers, 
or distinguish between different types of enterprises such as large commercial farmers, biological farmers, 
mixed farmers, or different actors in the agro chain such as seed companies, farmers, processing industry and 
retailers. 
11  For example, the ministries representing agriculture (LNV) and the environment (VROM) often clashed in the 
1980s and 1990s.  
12  That of a sector, or a specific interest group, for example. This point is made most famously by Olson (1965). 
13  In an early phase of the research project, the author also greatly benefited from conversations with a number 
of experts. I especially wish to thank dr. Jan Bieleman, dr. Huib Silvis, prof. Cees Leeuwis, prof. Katrien 
Termeer, prof. Arie Oskam, Krijn Poppe, dr. Anton Schuurman, dr. Harro Maat and prof. Frans van Waarden. 
Their ideas and literature suggestions have been very valuable.  
14  Although often accompanied by a short English summary. 
15  Most productive have been scholars at the Rural History Group of Wageningen University and Research 
Centre (WUR; formerly the agricultural university), which formerly published its series Bijdragen Agrarische 
Geschiedenis (A.A.G. ‘Contributions to Agrarian History’) and at the Netherlands Agricultural Historical 
Institute, a collaborative research institute of the universities in Wageningen and Groningen, which publishes 
the series Historia Agriculturae. Bieleman (2010) has written a comprehensive overview of Dutch agricultural 
history (1500-2000) in English. Other historical monographs on Dutch agriculture and countryside (in 
English) include De Vries (1974) on the 16th and 17th centuries and Knibbe (1993) and Van Zanden (1994) on 
the 19th and early 20th centuries. For more concise treatments see Knibbe (2000) and Smits (2008). General 
economic histories of specific periods in Dutch history (all written in English) include Van Bavel (2010) on 
the period 500-1600, De Vries and Van der Woude (1997) on the period 1500-1815, Van Zanden and Van Riel 
(2004) on the period 1780-1914 and Van Zanden (1998) on the period 1914-1995. All pay considerable 
attention to agricultural development. 
16  Van der Poel (1959) on Van Brakell van der Eng; Veldink (1970) on W.C.H. Staring; Krips-van der Laan 
(1985) on S.L. Louwes; Hoppenbrouwers (ed.) (1991) on ten key figures in agricultural history; Krips-van der 
Laan (1999) on D.R. Mansholt; De Bruin and Werkman (2001) on M. Ruppert; Geurts (2002) on H.D. 
Louwes; Merriënboer (2006) on S.L. Mansholt; Kamp (2009) on D. Hoetink (a civil servant at the ministry of 
agriculture during the 1930s crisis).  
17  Vermeulen (1966) on 19th century agricultural interest representation; Munters (1989) on farmers’ influence 
in local politics; De Ru (1980) on radical farmers’ organization in the 1930s; Van Loon (1951), Van der Poel 
(1949), Bieleman et al. (1995) and Van Cruyningen (2010) on 19th-century agricultural societies; Croesen 
(1934), Piers (1959), Manders (1984) and Siemes (2004) on the Dutch Agricultural Committee (KNLC); 
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Diepenhorst and Van den Heuvel (1948), Niemeijer (1964), Vermaat (1994), Duffhues (1996), Korsten (1996), 
Smits (1996), Smits (1997) and Van der Woude (2001) on different regional and national farmers’ unions; 
Krajenbrink (2005) on the Agricultural Board (Landbouwschap); Frouws (1994), Van Dijk, Klep and Merkx 
(1999) and Broersma (2010) on agricultural interest representation and legitimacy in recent decades; 
Schuurman (forthcoming) on the long-term development of agricultural interest representation. 
18  Minderhoud (1957) on cooperatives in general, De Boer (1976) and Veldman, Van Royen and Veraart (1999) 
on purchasing cooperatives (Cebeco); Geluk (1967) and Dekker (1996) on dairy cooperatives; Plantenberg 
(1987) and Kemmers and Gijsberts (1992) on horticultural auctions, Sluyterman et al. (1998) on credit 
cooperatives (Rabobank), Stuivenberg (1977) on the general development of the cooperative movement. See 
also Rommes (forthcoming) on the rise of the cooperative movement.  
19  Verkaik (1972), Maltha (1976), Vijverberg (1996), Roseboom and Rutten (1999), Maat (2001), Maat (2003) 
and Dijksterhuis and Van der Meulen (2007) on agricultural research; Smit (1966), Van der Poel (1976), 
Goudswaard (1986), Van der Burg (1988) and Duijvendak, Karel and Kooij (2008) on agricultural education, 
Offringa (1971) and Van der Haar (1993) on agricultural higher education, Zuurbier (1984) on agricultural 
extension services. Van der Poel (1983) on the role of government in Dutch agricultural mechanization in 
general. 
20  Andela (2000), Van den Bergh (2004) and Molema (2009) on land consolidation, Van den Brink (1990) on 
structural policy, Karel (2005) and Karel (2007) on rural policies in the post-WWII decades. 
21  Robinson (1961) on the representation of Dutch agriculture in international politics; Vermeulen (1984) and 
Vermeulen (1989), Molegraaf (1991) and Burger (1993) on the (role of the Netherlands in the) formation of EU 
agricultural policy; Sørensen (2008) on the role of Denmark and the Netherlands in the formation of EU 
agricultural policy. 
22  Bekke, De Vries and Neelen (1994) and Bekke and De Vries (2001) on the history of the Ministry of 
Agriculture in recent decades, Wielinga (2001) on leadership and change at the Ministry of Agriculture in 
recent decades. Also see Termeer (1993), Frouws (1994 and Krajenbrink (2005).  
23  Schuurman (forthcoming) contributes to filling this gap. Recently, Karel (2013) has written on post-1945 
Dutch agriculture in a broader societal context, though unfortunately in Dutch and without a theoretical 
framework or broader international outlook. 
24  The comparative literature includes Tracy (1989), Koning (1994) and Ingersent and Rayner (1999) on 
agricultural protectionism, Hayami and Ruttan (1971) and Lains and Pinilla (eds.) (2008) on agriculture and 
economic development, Federico (2008) on the economic development of world agriculture, 1800-2000, 
Vivier (ed.) (2008) and other works in the series ‘Rural History in Europe’ on a variety of topics in European 
rural history, Van Bavel and Hoyle (eds.) (2010) and other works resulting from the ‘Comparative Rural 
History of the North Sea Area’ (corn) project (see www.corn.ugent.be) on a variety of topics in European rural 
history. Also see the work of agricultural economists like Swinnen et al. (2000) and Olper (2001) and many 
others on the causes and effects of agricultural market policies on a European level. 
25  See for example Lindert (1991), Koning (2007), Chang (2009), Lains and Pinilla (2009), Smedshaug (2010) 
and Harwood (2012). 
26  Exceptions to this general statement include general studies by Lintsen et al. (eds.) (2000), Den Hartog 
(2001), Scholliers, Van Molle and Sarasua (eds.) (2005), Van Bruchem and Silvis (2008), Segers, Bieleman 
and Buyst (2009) and Van Molle and Segers (2011). Detailed studies on corporate players in the agro-food 
chain include Terlouw (1969), Bakker (1989) and Sluyterman (1996) on the sugar industry, Knaap (2000) on 
the potato starch industry, Homburg and Van Rooij (2004) on DSM Agro, Boersma on Philips Nat. Lab. (2002: 
161-81) and Fieldhouse (1978), Wilson (1984) and Langenhuyzen (1988) on Unilever. See Arnoldus (2002) for 
case studies on family firms in the food industry. Studies on cooperative players in the agro-food chain 
include Strijker (2008) on Avebé, De Wit (1990) on Windmill, Veldman, Van Royen and Veraart (1999) on 
Cebeco and Sluyterman et al. (1998) on Rabobank.  
27  Exceptions: Van Otterloo (2000) and Van Otterloo (2012). 
28  To illustrate the (perceived) importance of the Dutch agro sector: in 2010, two out of nine sectors that were 
chosen by the Dutch government as top sectors are closely related to the agro sector: ‘horticulture and 
propagation materials’ and ‘agro & food’. These sectors can since count on extra government support (‘a seat 
at the table’, allocation of public R&D efforts). 
29  As the degree of organization was limited, it would be anachronistic to apply the term ‘agricultural sector’ 
30  See also Lains and Pinilla (2009: 1-27). 
31  For a general treatment of agriculture in the Netherlands in the period 1850-1950 and further references, see 
Bieleman (2010: 149-235), on which this section is loosely based. Other sources used are referred to explicitly. 
See also Van Zanden (1986: 85-140), Van Zanden (1985), Jansma and Schroor (1987) and Van Zanden (1994). 
32  The potato blight of 1846-1847 devastated Ireland but also the Netherlands. Nevertheless, hunger became less 
of a concern in the 19th century. Some historians refer to the potato famine as the last great subsistence crisis 
in Europe.  
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33  A temporary exception are the final years of the First World War. The War and its consequences for 
agriculture and agricultural policy are discussed in the next chapter of this paper together with the crisis in 
the 1930s and the Second World War.  
34  The exact figures are 48 percent of exports and 23 percent of imports (Douw and Post 2000: 12). 
35  See Bos (1978: 226-277) and Pilat (1989) for more detailed information about Dutch agricultural exports in 
this period.  
36  Such as pipe drainage, steam threshing, steam pumping stations. 
37  Davis (1979) has calculated that British imports of raw materials and foodstuffs from north-western Europe 
increased from just under 1,8 million pounds per year in the mid-1780s to 13 million pounds in the mid-
1840s, doubling to 27 million pounds in the mid-1850s. While this is already an impressive increase, it was 
only a prelude to extensive imports of raw materials and foodstuffs into the British market in the second half 
of the 19th century. See also Bos (1978). 
38  Due to its great significance this ‘Grain Invasion’ (O’Rourke 1997) has been a topic for elaborate debate on 
agriculture since the late 19th century.  
39  See Federico (2005: 16-82) for an in-depth treatment of changes in world agricultural production and trade 
since 1800. 
40  Some important Dutch examples were strawboard in Groningen and potato starch in the Veenkoloniën 
(Strijker 2008). Sugar beet was another crop to be introduced on a large scale (Zeeland). The initiative was 
taken not by farmers, but by private sugar factory owners, who convinced farmers to switch to this new crop 
(Bakker 1989). 
41  An informative documentary (in Dutch) has been made about this impact of the saltpetre mines on arable 
farming in Groningen, Het Witte Goud, produced by Stichting Beeldlijn.  
42  According to Van Zanden (1993: 362) the export of livestock products was one of the corks which kept the 
19th century Dutch economy afloat.  
43  Mixed farmers shifted from arable ‘cash crops’ to selling their livestock products and using the arable land to 
produce fodder for their animals. Additionally, the low grain prices also meant that cheap fodder could be 
bought off the farm. By 1930, the collective production of eggs in the sandy soil areas was so great that the 
German agronomist Frost referred to it as a ‘dezentralisierte Großindustrie’. 
44  In the late 19th century, European farmers profited from the fact that cooling and transportation techniques 
were not yet sophisticated enough to enable transportation of perishable products across oceans, although 
this began to change in the first quarter of the 20th century and overseas competition for meat and dairy 
products increased as well. 
45  Knibbe (1993) has constructed a series for the period 1850-1950. Smits et al. (2000) have constructed a series 
for the period 1807-1913. The estimates differ somewhat, as Knibbe’s dataset assigns a larger share to 
livestock and horticulture compared to arable than the dataset of Smits et al.. In this figure, the Knibbe 
dataset has been taken as a starting point and the percentages for the year 1913 have been used to extrapolate 
back to 1807, based on the Smits et al. dataset pre-1913. Post-1950 data were obtained from CBS/LEI Land- en 
Tuinbouwcijfers (1951-2010). Thanks to Jan Bieleman for providing the data for the period 1950-1997. See 
also Knibbe (2000: 48) for a slightly different but broadly comparable interpretation of the data on sectoral 
shares in output (1807-1997). 
46  For a general treatment of the Dutch economy in the nineteenth century and further literature on Dutch 
industrialization, see Van Zanden and Van Riel (2004). 
47  See Mitchell (2005) for comparative historical statistics.  
48  The large number of land reclamations, especially in the eastern parts of the Netherlands in the second half of 
the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, testify to the importance of agriculture in this 
period. 
49  To supplement traditional manure, farmers could purchase artificial fertilizers (guano and saltpetre from 
South America, Thomas slag as the by-product of the iron industry and, from the 1910s onwards, chemically 
produced ammonia). Prices of fertilizers declined rapidly after 1880, stimulating their use (Van Zanden 1985: 
262) 
50  In addition to traditional types of fodder such as grains, potatoes and dairy by-products, Dutch farmers had 
used oil cakes (based on hempseed, linseed and winter rape) since the 17th century. From the 1890s onwards, 
large amounts of cakes based on tropical oils (copra, ground nut, soya bean and palm kernel) were imported, 
as well as large amounts of maize and bran from the United States. Feed cakes were also a by-product of the 
emerging margarine industry. See Knibbe (1993; 282-85) and Van Zanden (1991; 232). 
51  According to Van Zanden (1991; 231) who has calculated the fertilizer consumption in different European 
countries in 1910, the Netherlands (36 kg/ha) and Belgium (47 kg/ha) were clearly in the lead in terms of 
fertilizer consumption per hectare, followed by Germany (29 kg/ha) and, at a considerable distance, Denmark 
(9 kg/ha), Britain and Ireland (9 kg/ha) and France (11 kg/ha). The low amount of fertilizer used in Denmark, 
considering its competitive agricultural sector, can be explained by the low labour/land ratio compared to the 
Netherlands.  
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52  See Koning (1994) for a detailed treatment of this topic.  
53  The first cooperative was founded in 1877 under the illustrious name Welbegrepen Eigenbelang (‘well-
understood self-interest’). 
54  More efforts were made to engage local farmers, but large farmers remained strongly overrepresented in these 
organizations. 
55  In 1884, the Geldersche Maatschappij van Landbouw (Gelderland Agricultural Society), under the leadership 
of C.J. Sickesz, initiated a national agricultural exhibition in Amsterdam. The exhibition, which drew large 
numbers of international visitors and government representatives, brought the different regional 
organizations and other interested parties together, leading to the establishment of the NLC in that same year. 
56  The NLC was criticized as too elitist by small farmers, especially in the southern sandy soil regions, resulting in 
the establishment of the Nederlandsche Boerenbond (NBB, Dutch Farmers’ Union) in 1896, modelled on the 
German Rhenische Bauernverein (1882). The NBB was a confessional organization, supporting farmers on a 
professional as well as a religious level and stimulating the cooperative movement. In 1897 the NBB was 
incorporated into the NLC, which in 1913 represented approximately 130,000 members. In 1918, however, the 
confessional farmers again left the Koninklijke NLC (KNLC, the predicate Royal (Koninklijk) was added in 1917) 
and established their own societies, the Protestant Nederlandse Christelijke Boeren- en Tuindersbond (NCBTB, 
Dutch Christian Farmers’ and Horticulturalists’ Union, established in 1918) and the Katholieke Nederlandse 
Boeren- en Tuindersbond (KNBTB, Catholic Dutch Farmers’ and Horticulturalists’ Union). 
57  The agricultural labourers also organized themselves in pillarized unions: the Nederlandse Landarbeiders 
Bond (NLAB 1907), the Rooms-Katholieke Bond van Bloemist- Tuin- en Landarbeiders ‘Sint Deusdedit’ (RKLB 
1909) and the Nederlandsch Christelijke Landarbeidersbond (NCLB 1914). 
58  In 1842 an agricultural school was established in Groningen, and from 1846 onwards a yearly agricultural 
congress took place. Pioneering work was done by the geologist W.C.H Staring and others who actively 
lobbied for the establishment of an agricultural school in Wageningen in 1876. In 1877, the first Dutch 
agricultural experimental station was founded in Wageningen, modelled on earlier British (Rothenhamsted 
1843) and German (Möckern 1852) examples. On the initiative of agricultural societies, the first agricultural 
courses were established in the 1870s, a development that was given a strong impetus when in the 1880s the 
government started to facilitate and stimulate this development, and when private companies, such as the 
Dutch State Mines, which had an interest in the rapid diffusion of artificial fertilizers, became active in 
agricultural research and extension (Homburg and Van Rooij 2004). 
59  This section is largely based on Vermeulen (1966), unless noted otherwise.  
60  The focus of state policies was on agriculture rather than on the agro sector as a whole. The literature also 
focuses heavily on agricultural policy. Therefore, this section will be strongly focused on agriculture.  
61  For example, in 1776 the Maatschappy ter Bevordering van de Landbouw’ (Society for the Advancement of 
Agriculture) was founded. When the Hollandsche Maatschappij der Wetenschappen (Holland Society for the 
Sciences), added an Oeconomische Tak (economics branch) to its organization in 1777, agriculture became an 
important theme on the agenda. See Brusse and Mijnhardt (2011: 93). Some academics also began to become 
interested in agriculture, although their work remained rather isolated (Maat 2001: 39). 
62  Brusse and Mijnhardt (20001: 89) even go so far as to say that: ‘Until 1848, the Netherlands can rightly be 
called a state ruled by the nobility, in which agricultural interests held sway.’ 
63  The earliest measure (1799) was the creation of a fund for farmers who were struck by the Rinderpest. 
64  In the eastern parts of the country, this led to a push to move from the collective open field system which had 
existed for centuries to a more individualized system of land ownership. 
65  After which he moved to Utrecht to become professor of agriculture and botany. 
66 ‘ De landbouw maakt één der voornaamste bronnen uit van het binnenlands welvaren en moet derhalve onder 
bestendige zorg zijn van het bestuur’, quoted in Vermeulen (1966: 3). 
67  There was already some room for agriculture in the ideas about higher education. A reorganization of higher 
education in 1815 included the installation of a chair in landhuishoudkunde (agricultural sciences) at the 
various Dutch universities, one of the few vocational elements in higher education (Maat 2001: 40-41). 
Another major reorganization of higher education in 1863 led to the decision to establish an agricultural 
college in Wageningen. 
68  A veterinary school was established for this purpose in Utrecht in 1821. In 1865-66 a severe Rinderpest 
pandemic plagued Dutch cattle farmers. The government reacted with a policy of eradicate cattle in infected 
areas and managed to contain the disease much better than in earlier outbreaks in the 18th century. In 1870, 
the state further professionalized its efforts to fight animal diseases by installing a state veterinarian 
inspectorate (1870). 
69  The government’s hesitation to take an active role is illustrated by the initial objections in parliament to the 
establishment of a committee because of the costs of such an initiative. 
70 ‘ Niet in het algemeen mag op staatshulp worden gesteund, maar in ieder bijzonder geval moet worden 
onderzocht, of de staatsbemoeiing de gewenste werking zal uitoefenen, niet om zelf te scheppen of het leven te 
wekken, maar om datgene te beveiligen wat het particuliere initiatief wrocht, en in het leven te houden, wat 
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toont levensvatbaar te zijn. De staatsbemoeiing zal daarom niet een stut mogen worden voor afgeleefde of 
vermolmde levensvormen; niet de gevolgen mogen verzachten van blijvende oorzaken, maar zij zal alleen te 
rechtvaardigen zijn, wanneer zij de wortel van het kwaad afsnijdt en een gezonde ontwikkeling en groei 
mogelijk maakt en voorbereidt.’ (Vermeulen 1966: 73) 
71  The expenses of the Directorate for Agriculture show a modest upward trend between 1898 and 1940, but in 
that period never exceeded 10 million guilders, except for two exceptional years (1915, 1921) (VMDL 1911-
1940). The crisis legislation in the 1930s, discussed in the next chapter of this paper, was paid for from a 
different budget (Krips-Van der Laan 1985). 
72  “De regeringsbemoeiing  (met de landbouw ) mag toch niet alleen op de bevordering van de grootst mogelijke 
ontwikkeling der cultuur, maar moet evenzeer op een billijke verdeling der vruchten daarvan onder de 
landbouwende bevolking gericht zijn.” Quoted in Jansma and Schroor (1987). 
73  To illustrate the limited success of this Act: in 1929 2,000 hectares had been consolidated, another 2,000 
were in progress. In the decade after 1958, when a new law was adopted, 50,000 hectares were consolidated 
annually (Huizinga and Strijker 1983: 146).  
74  By 1920, there were 20 agricultural winter schools and 10 horticultural winter schools. By 1927 there were 
also ten lower agricultural schools. 
75  Including: sugar (1903), agricultural machinery (1905), phytopathology (1906), plant breeding (1910) and 
bulb research (1917).  
76  Three new experiment stations were established in 1890, in Groningen, Hoorn and Breda (later moved to 
Goes). Later, three more stations were established, in Maastricht (1908), Wageningen (1919) and Beekbergen 
(1921) 
77  The following section about the agricultural knowledge infrastructure is largely based on Maat (2003: 233-
262) and Roseboom and Rutten (1999). For a further elaboration, also see Maat (2001: 56-93) on agricultural 
research and Goudswaard (1986) and Maat (2001: 94-141) on agricultural education.  
78  For example, the Maastricht experiment station tested the quality of agricultural inputs such as artificial 
fertilizers by developing new methods of analysis, introducing standardized procedures and carrying out tens 
of thousands of actual tests every year. It also arbitrated in trade conflicts. Private companies like the Dutch 
State Mines, DSM (Nederlandse Staatsmijnen), which supplied artificial fertilizers, wanted to be involved and 
seconded their own employees to the experiment station. 
79  The importance of the pressing demand for these specific services rather than others in determining the 
direction of a new institute is also illustrated by the history of the Instituut voor Veredeling van 
Landbouwgewassen (Agricultural Crop Breeding Institute, 1912). A number of biology professors and regional 
societies founded this private institute with the aim of pursuing fundamental knowledge. Once again, 
however, the scientific principles did not lead to the expected results in terms of useful knowledge. The 
Institute shifted its focus to the categorization of new crops and, in the 1920s, began to register new breeds, a 
practice that became obligatory for farmers (Maat, 2003: 254). For livestock farmers, the 
Rijksseruminrichting (State Vaccination Institute, 1904) played a key role in preventing and combating a wide 
range of animal diseases.  
80  Such as the Botercontrolestation (Butter Inspection Station 1903). 
81  Such as the Veeartsenijkundige Dienst (Veterinary Inspectorate, 1870) and the Plantenziektekundige Dienst 
(Phytopathological Inspectorate, 1901). 
82  Such as the Boterwet (Butter Ac, 1890), Wet Uitvoerkeuring Vlees (Meat Export Inspection Act 1907) the 
Landbouwkwaliteitswet (Agricultural Quality Act 1912) and the Wet tot bestrijding van bedrog in den handel 
in meststoffen zaaizaden en veevoer (Trade in Fertilizers, Seeds and Feed (Prevention of Fraud) Act 1920) 
83  Such as the Rijksbotermerk (1904) and Rijkskaasmerken (1913, 1918). 
84  Which, because their sales were at stake, were also involved in the establishment of research facilities and 
experiment plots. 
85  Cooperative dairy factories performed quality inspections themselves, because of their expertise. Animal 
diseases were fought in close cooperation with cooperative herd book societies. The state also encouraged the 
growth of the cooperative credit movement.  
86  An important policy that does not easily fit into the other state policies was the state’s increasing role in 
reclamation of the rangelands (Thissen 1993). First attempts were also made to stimulate land consolidation.  
87  See Christensen (1983) for a detailed account and Henriksen (2009: 117-147) for a concise account of Danish 
agricultural development. See Tracy (1989: 107-115) and Olsson and Morell (2010: 315-347) for Danish 
agricultural policy.  
88  See Blomme (1992) on Belgian agricultural development and Van Molle (2008: 159-176) on Belgian 
agricultural policy. 
89  There is an extensive literature on British agricultural development. For a concise comparative account, see 
Broadberry (2009: 76-94). Also see Tracy (1989: 35-56), Brassley (2008: 259-278), Brassley, Hoyle and 
Turner (2010: 81-110) on British agricultural policy. 
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90  See Vivier (2009: 210-233) on French agricultural development, and Tracy (1989:57-82), Cleary (1989), 
Vivier (2008:57-76), Boulet (2008: 247-258) and Jessenne and Vivier (2010:139-168) on French agricultural 
policy. 
91  See Grant (2009: 178-209) on German agricultural development, and Tracy (1989: 83-106), Kulhawy (2008: 
77-94), Harwood (2008: 135-58) and Brakensike and Mahlerwein (2010:253-83). 
92  For these and more country studies, see articles in the volumes edited by Vivier (2008) and Lains and Pinilla 
(2009). 
93  For country studies, see articles in the volumes edited by Vivier (2008) and Lains and Pinilla (2009). The 
latter volume tries to develop a theoretical understanding of the role of agriculture in economic development 
that transcends the differences in region and timing.  
94  Van Rooij (2007: 142) shows that the first industrial state laboratory was founded in 1910, at which point 
there were already 18 agricultural laboratories (including the abovementioned experiment stations). 
95  The term ‘structural change’ or ‘structural shift’ is often used by development theorists to denote the 
development from low-productivity sectors, mostly agriculture, to high-productivity sectors in industry and 
services. However, as the Dutch experience shows, such a shift to high-productivity can also (partially) take 
place within agriculture, and certainly within the agro sector as a whole, in which agriculture then plays a key 
role.  
96  “Wij kunnen zeggen, dat met die overheidsbemoeiing tegelijk ook een nieuwe tijd begonnen is voor onze 
gehele landbouw. Niet door de overheidsbemoeiing alleen, natuurlijk: dat zou niet mogelijk zijn geweest. 
Maar tegelijkertijd is er in de Nederlandse boerenstand een nieuwe geest gevaren, een geest van energie, van 
wil en van durf, een geest ook van samenwerking, waardoor de oude, ultra-individualistische geest op de 
achtergrond gedrongen werd.” Quoted in Vermeulen (1966: 92) 
97  Due to the exploitation of large swaths of land in the Western settlement countries (USA, Canada, New 
Zealand, Australia) as well as a revolution in transportation and the use of inputs. 
98  This fact is often referred to as ‘Engel’s law’ in the literature.  
99  For a detailed account of technological change in agriculture in the period 1950-2000, see the chapters by 
Bieleman and Priester in Schot et al. (2000). For a more concise account in English see Bieleman (2010).  
100  Maddison (1991: 150-51) calculated that in 1987, the level of output per person in agriculture was 97% of the 
average output per person in the whole economy, while this percentage was lower for France (68%), Germany 
(42%), Japan (34%), the UK (86% and the US (92%), illustrating the relatively high productivity of the Dutch 
agricultural sector. The productivity of the sector was the result of persistent productivity growth since the 
1950s, which was higher than the productivity growth in industry and much higher than the productivity 
growth in services.  
101  Many refused to accept defeat and kept their businesses going, despite economic losses, only to concede at a 
later moment. See Schnabel (2001). The fact that farmers often actually live on their farms and have often 
been closely attached to both their land and their business for generations distinguishes farmers from small-
scale entrepreneurs in most other sectors.  
102  In 2010, there were 72,324 farm holdings in the Netherlands, a decrease of over 25% compared to 2000. 
103  Van Bruchem and Silvis (2008: 18-19), using the following definition of ‘agrosector’: primary agri- and 
horticulture and those industries that are occupied with delivery or processing of agrarian products and foods. 
Part of this delivery or processing relates to products that are imported from abroad.’ (Van Bruchem and 
Silvis, 2008: 13) 
104  Van Zanden (1998: 141) Seen with an even broader lens, large sections of the Dutch economy – from 
consulting to transportation, and from scientific research to tourism – are also still closely associated with 
and dependent upon the agro sector. Van Bruchem and Silvis (2008: 17) use the term ‘agro complex’ to 
denote this broader interpretation. They (2008: 37) also note that in 2005 the food, drinks and tobacco 
industry accounted for and a fifth of employment and a quarter of the total value added in Dutch industry. 
105  The latter can also be partly explained by the fact that products from the rapidly growing horticultural sector 
need little processing and are not part of the agro-food chain. 
106  At present, approximately 80 percent of agricultural exports go to EU member states (Silvis 2009: 90). 
107  Flowers (63.9), eggs (61.1), pigs (56.6), bulbs (56.4), milk (53.1), cocoa powder (48.6), tomatoes (43.4), 
potatoes (35.5), cocoa butter (32.4), pig meat (31.8) and artificial fertilizers (31.8).  
108  Figures for 1994/95 and 2004/05 in parentheses: Cut flowers (67, 59), mussels (58, 47), seed potatoes (67, 
57), consumption potatoes (18, 11), cocoa butter (42, 33), cocoa powder (55, 38), piglets (51, 29), pigs (37, 23), 
animal vaccines (27, 19), beer (22, 19).  
109  To illustrate this point: the price of land for arable farmers and dairy farmers, respectively, increased from 5 
and 6 times the net value added in the early 1970s to 20 and 15 times in the late 1990s (Van Bruchem and 
Silvis, 2008: 57). 
110  The international bestseller Silent Spring (1962) by the biologist Rachel Carson. 
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111  In the memorandum Problemen rond de organische mestproductie (‘Problems relating to organic manure 
production’, 1969) by the extension officer C.H. Henkes (Wielinga 2001: 60) 
112  Berkhout and Van Bruchem (2011: 40) calculated that the production value increased fivefold between 1950 
and 2010. The percentage growth declined from 4% yearly in the 1970s to almost no growth in the 2000s. 
Nevertheless, production growth has been stronger throughout the whole period than in France, Germany, 
Belgium and Denmark (Van Bruchem and Silvis, 2005: 47).  
113  LEI/CBS Land- en tuinbouwcijfers (2011: 53). 
114  Agro-tourism, stalling goods and animals, processing of products, selling at home, healthcare tasks (LEI/CBS 
Land- en tuinbouwcijfers, 2011: 37). 
115  The percentage of ‘mega-farms’ in total production rose from 5% of total agricultural production capacity in 
1994 to 17% in 2004. The minimum threshold for classification as a ‘mega-farm’ is defined as: 320 milk cows, 
12,500 slaughter pigs, 160,000 breeding chickens, 340 hectares of arable production or 3.5 hectares of 
glasshouse horticulture (Van Bruchem and Silvis 2008: 79).  
116  E.g.: Public outrage resulted from the large-scale use of antibiotics in Dutch livestock farming, prescribed by 
veterinarians with financial interests. The debate started after the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad 
published an article on the topic, ‘Het antibioticasyndicaat’ (‘The antibiotics syndicate’), on 9 April 2011. See 
also: The denial of the existence of the relationship between pesticide use and high bee mortality by a Bayer 
Cropscience-sponsored institute at Wageningen University and Research Centre (WUR) has stirred up 
journalistic research and public outrage. The investigative journalism television programme Zembla aired the 
documentary ‘Moord op de honingbij’ (‘Murder of the honeybee’) to address this issue. WUR has also received 
criticism for distorting the findings of research conducted on the health benefits of milk consumption. See for 
example the article ‘Hoogleraar: Wageningen Universiteit verdraait onderzoek over melk’ (‘Professor: 
Wageningen University distorts research on milk’) in the Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant of 26 September 
2011. 
117  See for example Van der Ploeg (2003), Van der Ploeg (2008) and Mazoyer and Roudart (2006), who speak of 
a worldwide ‘agricultural crisis’. From a completely different perspective, the Dutch Party for the Animals 
(Partij voor de Dieren) also objects to the agricultural system of production, especially the continuing process 
of upscaling in the intensive livestock sector. The party has held two of the 150 seats in the Dutch Lower 
House of Parliament since 2006 and one of the 75 seats in the Upper House since 2007. The debate about the 
need for and desirability of intensive agriculture also flared up at Wageningen University in early September 
2012 in reaction to a plea by the University’s president and chairman Aalt Dijkhuizen. See the articles ‘Of 
intensieve landbouw, of honger’ (‘Intensive farming or starvation’) in the Dutch newspaper Trouw of 3 
September 2012 and ‘Dijkhuizen bedrijft geen wetenschap, maar politiek’ (‘Dijkhuizen engaged in politics, not 
science’) in the same newspaper on 5 September 2012. Despite the relevance and importance of these issues, 
an evaluation of the different position falls outside the scope of this paper. 
118  The first COPA chairman was Dutch, but since then the influence of Dutch farmers in the European 
representative organizations has decreased. 
119 The protest against the Agricultural Board came to a head in 1963 when three farmers were evicted from their 
farms in the village of Hollandscheveld because of (deliberate) ‘overdue’ payments to the Agricultural Board, 
leading to a large, widely publicized farmers’ protest. For a more detailed account, see Ten Caat (1994) and 
Krajenbrink (2005).  
120  Author’s translation. 
121  As in the previous chapter, the focus of state policies was on agriculture rather than on the agro sector as a 
whole.  
122  From 1925 to 1930 a committee, the Commissie Haffmans, investigated the possibilities of reducing state 
involvement in and expenditures on agriculture.  
123  It should be noted that there were also revenues for the state, so that the net costs of agricultural policy were 
not as high (for example: 17 million guilders deficit in 1937) (Huizinga and Strijker 1983: 148). 
124  Louwes was chairman of the Geldersche Maatschappij van de Landbouw (Gelderland Agricultural Society), 
brother of KNLC president and later chairman of the Agricultural Board, H.D. Louwes and nephew of S.L. 
Mansholt, later a Dutch minister and European Commissioner for Agriculture.  
125  With some boldness, Knibbe (1993: 198) even argues that Louwes can be seen as the first agricultural man to 
enter an administration which had previously been dominated by bureaucrats, industrialists and tradesmen 
from the provinces of Holland. 
126  In 1940, the number of students at Wageningen had grown to 659 and the University offered programmes in 
agriculture, colonial agriculture, horticulture, forestry and colonial forestry.  
127  The state intervened in agriculture to ensure the availability of food, while farmers did not want to give up 
their lucrative export opportunities and felt that their business freedom was being violated (Krajenbrink, 
2005: 23-24). 
128  Krajenbrink (2005: 41-49). For an extensive account of Dutch agriculture during the Second World War, see 
Trienekens (1985), Trienekens (1995) and Klemann (2002).  
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129  29% of total Dutch production capacity, and 14% of the agricultural production capacity, had been destroyed 
by the War (Wieleng,a 2009: 214). There were serious shortages of prepared land, labourers and horses. 
Because of the destruction of infrastructure, the western part of the Netherlands had become isolated.  
130  The production levels of 1939 had been reached as early as 1950 (Wielenga 2009: 220). 
131  Parity of income with other sectors was the guiding principle.  
132  Van der Ploeg (2003) even goes so far as to say that the state pushed its ideas of unilinear modernization so 
far that it could only see a ‘virtual farmer’, rather than acknowledging the variety which actually made up 
Dutch agriculture. 
133  Remarkable about the Mansholts was their socialist inclination, while practically all other gentlemen farmers 
from Groningen were staunch liberals.  
134  For an early description, see Louwes (1980). 
135  The initial capital of the fund was 25 million Dutch guilders. Until 1999 it provided security for approximately 
64,000 loans to a total amount of 5 billion Dutch guilders (Douw and Post 2000: 106).  
136  Some fragmented information on land prices may be found in Van der Meer et al. (1991: 37), Van Bruchem 
and Silvis (2008: 57) and Douw and Post (2000: 88). 
137  Key to the formulation of this problem was the publication of an LEII report in 1951, an exposition of the 
‘smallholders’ issue’ in the sandy soil districts (Maris, Scheer and Visser 1951). 
138  The expansion of export markets thanks to a common European market in the 1960s eased some of the 
pressure, but it returned in the 1970s and 1980s as markets again began to saturate as production capacity in 
Europe approached and then achieved self-sufficiency and even overproduction. See first section of this 
chapter. 
139  The latter was mainly a result of a successful lobby of the agricultural organizations. The balance between 
development on the one hand and outflow on the other remained a contested issue between the state and 
agricultural organizations – which saw their constituency shrink as a result of labour outflow. 
140  Between 1972 and 1985, approximately 23,000 loans were extended within the framework of the interest 
subsidy scheme to a total amount of 4 billion Dutch guilders. 60 percent of the expansion of the dairy cattle 
stock as well as 30 percent of the greenhouse acreage took place on farms that received loans through the 
interest subsidy scheme (Douw and Post 2000: 107). 
141  The Dutch state mainly lobbied against a European-level structural policy. The reason for this was that Dutch 
agriculture was relatively productive compared to European competitors. The benefits of structural policy 
would therefore go mainly to farmers outside the Netherlands, increasing foreign competition and draining 
Dutch state expenditures on agriculture.  
142  A detailed account of the organizational development of the state extension service is given by Zuurbier for 
the post-war period until 1980 (1984: 50-78). 
143  In 1970, the research infrastructure consisted of an Agricultural College with 95 academic staff and over 60 
research units and laboratories, 21 specialist research institutes and nine experiment stations (Maat 2001: 72, 
74). 
144  Maat (2001: 69). 
145  For a detailed account of the history of the NRLO (including a brief English summary), see Dijksterhuis, Van 
der Meulen and Van der Most (2007). For agricultural research policy more broadly, see Verkaik (1972), 
Maltha (1976) and Maat (2001: 67-73). 
146  The latter issue has not yet received much academic attention.  
147  See Vermeulen (1989) for a detailed account of Mansholt’s plans on European agricultural policy in the period 
1945-1953. Also see Burger (1993: 26-29).  
148  France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.  
149 ‘ Blijkbaar zijn de doelstellingen van het landbouwbeleid zozeer gemeengoed geworden van het Nederlandse 
volk, dat hierover thans tussen de belangrijkste politieke maatschappelijke groeperingen geen principieel 
verschil van meningen meer bestaat.’ as quoted in Louwes (1980: 237). 
150  For a recent and well-researched account of this period, see Karel (2013: 155-84). 
151  For a positive assessment of Industry Boards and Commodity Boards, see Van Waarden (2011).  
152  ‘beleid zal niet meer samen onder de warme deken met de landbouworganisaties gemaakt worden.’ As quoted 
in Wielinga (2001:87). 
153  ‘(dat ) het landbouwkundig onderzoek in versterkte mate rekening moet gaan houden met de andere 
deelgebieden van onze samenleving, en dat de resultaten van dit onderzoek ook voor meer doeleinden buiten 
de directe sfeer van de landbouw toepasselijk zijn of toepasselijk gemaakt kunnen worden.’ As quoted in Van 
der Meer (1991: 37). 
154  For example, horticulturalists had already developed their own private advisory organization, the Stichting 
Nederlandse Tuinbouw Studieverenigingen (Dutch Horticultural Study Association) (Wielinga 2001: 73). 
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155  The organically developed nature of the agricultural research infrastructure is nicely illustrated by the fact 
that, even after earlier reorganizations, the NRLO still consisted of over 100 committees in which some 1,000 
individuals were involved (Roseboom and Rutten 1999: 224). 
156  The amount of research funding coming directly from the University’s budget (‘eerste geldstroom’) decreased 
from 70 percent in 1976 to 43 percent in 1994, while the amount coming from competitive public research 
funds (‘tweede geldstroom’) increased from 10 to 14 percent and the amount coming from private research 
funds (‘derde geldstroom’) increased from 20 to 44 percent. (Roseboom and Rutten 2001: 243).  
157  The share of public R&D expenditure on agriculture declined over time. In 1995, 55.6 percent of agricultural 
research in the Netherlands was conducted by public organizations (52 percent by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
16.2 by other ministries , with the remainder coming from the EU, levies to the Commodity Boards and the 
Netherlands Scientific Research Council), while the remained was conducted by private parties (Roseboom 
and Rutten 1999: 245). 
158  In the first crisis years the Dutch government stubbornly pursued a course of free trade and long refused to 
abandon the Gold Standard. 
159  A milling ratio of 20-35 percent was in force in the Netherlands, whereas the ratio in France, Germany, Italy 
and Sweden was close to 100 percent (Tracy 1989: 124). 
160  See for example Sheingate (2001). 
161  Although state involvement in agriculture has taken a much more limited and different form since the 1980s, 
it is still quite considerable in comparison to other sectors. 
162  Van Bruchem (2004: 5-6) sums up a range of arguments that make agriculture special and justify a role for 
the state. See Meester (2004: 16-17) for a critical reply.  
163  Clearly, the CAP was not a neatly designed technocratic instrument, but rather the outcome of a political 
process. This perhaps explains its contradictory, short-sighted and heavily criticized nature. The CAP has been 
the subject of extensive academic debates among historians, economists and political scientists. Given this 
abundance and the scope of this paper, these debates are largely left out of this paper and the CAP is only 
discussed on a very general level. For more information, see Vermeulen (1989), Tracy (1989: 215-356), Burger 
(1993), Molegraaf (1999) and Oskam and Meester and Silvis (2011). 
164  Tracy (1989: 218-19). 
165  In line with the classical argument of Olson (1965).  
166  Bieleman (2000: 228) and Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000: 371) argue along similar lines.  
